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THE DRUG COURT PARADIGM

Jessica M. Eaglin*
ABSTRACT

Drug courts are specialized,problem-oriented diversion programs. Qualifying
offenders receive treatment and intense court-supervisionfrom these specialized
criminal courts, rather than standard incarceration.Although a body of scholarship critiques drug courts and recent sentencing reforms,few scholars explore the
drug court movement's influence on recent sentencing policies outside the context
of specialized courts.
This Article explores the broadereffects of the drug court movement, arguing
that it created a particular paradigm that states have adopted to manage
overflowing prisonpopulations. This drug court paradigmhas proved attractive to
politicians and reformers alike because it facilitates sentencing reforms for
low-level, nonviolent drug offenders that provide treatment-oriented diversions
from incarceration.Though reforms adopted within the drug court paradigm have
contributed to stabilizingprison populationsand have createda nationalplatform
to discuss mass incarceration,this paradigm has limits that may prevent long-term
reductions in prison populations. This Article identifies three limitations of the
drug court paradigm: First,by focusing exclusively on low-level drug offenders,
the approach detrimentally narrows analysis of the problem of mass incarceration; second, by presenting a "solution," it obscures the ways that recent reforms
may exacerbate mass incarceration;third, by emphasizing a focus on treatmentoriented reforms, this paradigm aggressively inserts the criminal justice system
into the private lives of an expanding mass of citizens.
This Article locates the current frame's origin in the drug court movement.
Identifying this connection is important for two reasons: First, it provides new
insight to how we define "success" in criminal justice, and why. Second, it
illuminates a growing tension between government actors and the generalpublic 's
appetitefor criminaljustice reforms that meaningfully reduce mass incarceration.

* Associate Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law and former counsel, Justice Program,
Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law. J.D. & M.A. in Literature, Duke University; B.A., Spelman
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Conference and the faculties at Notre Dame Law School, and Wisconsin School of Law for helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this Article. Additionally, thanks to Rebecca Maller, Rucha Desai, and Elliot Edwards for their
research assistance in preparing this Article. © 2016, Jessica M. Eaglin.

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:595

INTRODUCTION

The United States finds itself on the precipice of a distinct transformation in the
criminal justice system. State and federal lawmakers are implementing or considering major sentencing reforms aimed at managing growing prison populations.
This Article argues that these sentencing reforms conform to a developing frame of
reform herein referred to as "the drug court paradigm." Influenced by the drug
court movement, this frame shapes the way lawmakers are responding to mass
incarceration beyond simply through the expansion of drug treatment programs.
While this frame has successfully produced policy changes and helped to stabilize
incarceration across the country, 2 it also suffers from obscured pitfalls. This Article
identifies the frame, exposes the pitfalls, and provides new insight into the
significance of criminal justice policies in shaping political questions on why and
how we punish.
This Article first explores the defining characteristics of current sentencing
reforms and locates their origins in the drug court movement. Drug courts are
specialized court diversion programs created in the late 1980s to provide qualifying offenders with treatment to address drug addiction and court supervision in lieu
of long incarceration terms.3 The "drug court paradigm" refers to the influence of
the drug court movement in framing recent sentencing policies. 4 To facilitate
sentencing reforms, lawmakers frame their policies to address the severe punishment of low-level, nonviolent (drug) offenders. They justify these policy changes
based on evidence of effectiveness and efficiency.5 This Article demonstrates the
pervasiveness of this frame by analyzing recent reform efforts in three

1. See Matt Apuzzo, Holder and Republicans Unite to Soften Sentencing Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/us/politics/holder-and-republicans-unite-to-soften-sentencing-laws.html
(discussing the federal government considering sentencing reform); Jennifer Steinhauer, BipartisanPush Builds to
Relax Sentencing Laws, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/us/push-to-scale-backsentencing-laws-gains-momentum.html; What is Justice Reinvestment?, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, https://www.bja.gov/Programs/JRlonepager.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) (stating that
seventeen states have adopted Justice Reinvestment, a data-driven approach to reduce spending on corrections
and reinvest identified savings in evidence-based strategies).
2. See E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2014 1 2 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/pl4.pdf (showing incarcerated population size declining since 2012, but largely leveling off
around size of population in 2005); SENTENCING PROJECT, U.S. PRISON POPULATION TRENDS: BROAD VARIATION
AMONG STATES IN RECENT YEARS (2015), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc Prison
PopulationTrends fs.pdf (acknowledging that "the number of people in prison in the United States has stabilized
in recent years").
3. History: Justice ProfessionalsPursuea Vision, NAT'LASS'N OF DRUG COURT PROF'LS, http://www.nadcp.org/
learn/what-are-drug-courts/drug-court-history (last visited Sep. 3, 2014) (noting that the first drug court was
established in 1989, and today more than 2734 drug courts operate in all fifty states and U.S. territories); see also
infra Section I.
4. See infra Section II.
5. See infra Section II.
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"jurisdictions"-the
Justice Reinvestment (JRI) states,6 California, and the federal
7
system.
The drug court paradigm has surface appeal: reforms adhering to its frame have
modestly reduced reliance on incarceration in some states.8 However, the drug
court paradigm suffers critical shortcomings that may actually perpetuate overreliance on incarceration in the status quo and exacerbate flaws in the criminal justice
system. This Article identifies three particular limitations. First, by narrowing the
scope of the problem to just the lowest level offenders, this frame excludes most
offenders from the benefits of justice reforms. 9 As states continue to adopt reforms
designed to reduce incarceration and save money, their impact is often so limited
by eligibility requirements that relatively few offenders in the system actually
benefit from key changes being implemented. Second, the drug court paradigm
obscures reforms that continue to increase sentence length for most offenders
in the system. The focus on identifying low-level, nonviolent offenders for
distinct, treatment-oriented interventions are often coupled with rhetoric and
legislation that increases sentence severity for all other types of offenders. These
coupled sentencing changes threaten to exacerbate mass incarceration long-term. 1o
Finally, and perhaps most critically, the drug court paradigm encourages treatmentoriented criminal justice interventions. Though facially benign, such reforms
expand the scope of state control over the lives of those entangled in the justice
system. Increasing opportunities to intervene in private lives through the justice

6. "Justice Reinvestment Initiative ("JRI") states" refers to those states where the JRI entered the state to
propose legislation for reducing the prison population. There are twenty-seven JRI states: Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., ENDING MASS
INCARCERATION: CHARTING A NEW JUSTICE REINVESTMENT 1, n.1 (2013), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/
publications/senCharting%20a%2ONew%2OJustice%2OReinvestment.pdf. Only eighteen of those states adopted JRI legislation to reduce the prison population. Those states include: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Vermont. Id.
7. See infra Parts II.A-C.
8. See JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 345 (2014), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/18613/the-growth-of-

incarceration-in-the-united-states-exploring-causes ("Although the precise impact of ... [recent sentencing reforms] has yet to be determined, it is reasonable to assume that they contributed to the overall decline in
incarceration rates among the states.").

9. See infra Part III.A. An empirical debate about the value of rehabilitative treatment versus incarceration for
nonviolent and violent offenders goes beyond the scope of this Article. SHELLI B. ROSSMAN ET AL., URBAN INST.,
THE MULTI-SITE ADULT DRUG COURT EVALUATION: THE IMPACT OF DRUG COURTS 258-61 (2011), https://www.ncjrs.

gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/237112.pdf (reducing reoffences among people with histories of violent offenses produces the greatest public safety and cost saving gains from drug courts); Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin,
Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be Reduced?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 13, 31 (2011) ("[S]tudies
suggest that increases in the severity of punishment have at best only a modest deterrent effect."); Jessica M.
Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189, 211 12 (2013). Rather, this Article focuses on the
strategic decision to focus reforms on low level, nonviolent offenders only.
10. See infra Part III.B.
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system may actually increase the number of people touched by the system, thereby
undercutting efforts to reduce the negative effects of mass incarceration.1
Few scholars critically examine why recent sentencing reforms are being
formulated within this paradigmatic frame. 12 Instead, most scholars seek to
improve current reforms 13 or to provide theoretical foundations that can guide
reforms going forward. 14 This Article seeks to fill the critical gap in current
scholarship concerning why recent reforms are designed to focus on low-level,
nonviolent offenders through an effectiveness lens. It does so by connecting the
body of scholarship on drug courts as an institutional response to mass incarceration with the developing scholarship on recent legislative and policy reforms to
manage prison populations. By exploring the connection between drug courts and
the current paradigm of criminal justice reform driving recent sentencing policies
in the states, this Article demonstrates the significant influence that previous
innovations in criminal justice provide in shaping current efforts to reduce
mass incarceration. It also provides new insights on how lawmakers choose to
understand and respond to mass incarceration.
More broadly, exposing the influence of drug courts on recent reforms challenges current perceptions about why particular criminal justice interventions are
salient for both lawmakers and the public. It is generally accepted that budgetary
constraints drive the bipartisan incentives to address incarceration. 1 5 This Article
joins several scholars in identifying a deeper, political motivation to this convergence. Consistent with sociologist David Garland's observations in The Culture of

11. See infra Part III.C.
12. Scholars do focus on questions of why sentencing reforms are occurring now. See, e.g., Cecelia Klingele,
The Promise and Perils of Evidence-Based Practices, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 537, 547 51 (2016) (discussing
impact of social and fiscal costs on criminal justice policies); Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of
Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1276, 1297 99 (2005) (discussing the impact of fiscal costs on sentencing
policy). Scholars generally take for granted that reforms focus on low level, nonviolent drug offenders. Even in
instances where scholars do address questions of what sentencing reforms look like, they often fall back on
references to the War on Drugs as the basis for reforms. See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Street Diversion and
Decarceration, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 165, 170 178 (2013) (explaining why states are seeking "smarter solutions"
to the War on Drugs). But see MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN

POLITICS 166 68 (2015) (discussing how the war against the War on Drugs shaped penal policy more broadly).
13. See, e.g., Fan, supra note 12, at 183 87 (proposing that street diversion programs provide a long-term
solution to public health and order problems while reducing unnecessary incarceration); Allegra M. McLeod,
Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1636-37 (2012)
("[Decarceration courts] forge a more sociologically and empirically oriented criminal justice framework."); see
also Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut CriminalJustice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. REv. 581, 633-48
(2012); Cecelia Klingele, The Early Demise of Early Release, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 415, 450 58 (2011); Alexandra
Natapoff, MisdemeanorDecriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REv. 1055, 1109 15 (2015); JUDITH GREENE & MARC
MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DOWNSCALING PRISONS: LESSONS FROM FOUR STATES, 2-4 (2010), http://www.

sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc-DownscalingPrisons2010.pdf.
14. See Eaglin, supra note 9, at 192 94; Fan, supra note 13, at 633-48; Michael M. O'Hear, Beyond
Rehabilitation:A New Theory of IndeterminateSentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1247, 1264 84 (2011).
15. See Barkow, supra note 12, at 1305 06 (discussing the role of budgetary constraints on reshaping the
politics of punishment); Eaglin, supra note 9, at 202 203 (same).
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Control, neoliberal perspectives on government failure drove institutional actors
and the public to lose faith in the state's ability to ensure criminal justice and public
safety. 16 The repercussions of that disillusionment continue to play a pivotal role in
penal policy. This Article argues that it drives the current shift towards "evidencebased practices and policies" as a central tenet of "successful" criminal justice
policy that drug courts helped establish. These empirically researched approaches
to criminal justice policy and practice, including the use of actuarial risk and needs
assessment instruments and graduated sanctions, are supported by data demonstrating measurable, positive outcomes that promote public safety. 17 Reforms adhering
to the drug court paradigm endorse and proliferate these evidence-based
interventions. 1'

Evidence-based practices and policies within the drug court paradigm also
transform the politics of punishment. While government actors adopt such policies
to manage public skepticism, this Article suggests that the public may perceive the
government's policies differently. Reforms embraced by the public but not by
government actors-such as California's Proposition 47-rhetorically adhere to
the drug court paradigm but move beyond some of its critical limitations.1 9 This
Article concludes that, to the public, perceptions of the government's failures
include skepticism about mass incarceration. Government actors' strict adherence
to the drug court paradigm suggests that this is a point that the government is not
yet willing to concede. The drug court paradigm thus illuminates the divide
between public and governmental appetites for criminal justice reform-a line that
should be pressed by advocates seeking to reduce mass incarceration.
Section I of this Article gives background on the development of drug courts as
a way to address the United States' growing prison population. Section II explains
the drug court paradigm, and describes recent policy reforms promulgated to
address systemic overreliance on incarceration. It focuses on sentencing reforms
adopted in three different categories of jurisdictions: the JRI states, California, and
the federal system. Section III identifies three shortcomings in adopting the drug
court paradigm as a long-term solution to mass incarceration: narrowing of the
frame, obscuring the problem, and expanding the criminal justice system's reach
without normative considerations about expanding the state's control over private
lives. Section IV discusses the origin of this paradigm within the drug court
movement and reflects on how this origin complicates the politics of punishment.
This Article concludes by suggesting that drug courts, as with recent criminal

16. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIMEAND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 105 11

(2001) (describing "[t]he new predicament" and its effect on contemporary policy and practice).
17. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 96 99 and accompanying text (describing evidence-based policies and practices, such as
the use of risk assessment tools and graduated sanctions); see also Klingele, supra note 12, at 555 58 (noting the
rise of evidence-based practices in the American criminal justice system).
19. See infra Part IV.B.
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justice reforms focused on evidence-based policies, provide piecemeal options to
reduce incarceration rather than wholesale solutions to mass incarceration.
I.

DRUG COURTS AS THE ALTERNATIVE TO MASS INCARCERATION

Between 1972 and 2010, the U.S. prison population increased from less than
200,000 prisoners to more than 1.6 million.20 Including jails, the United States
incarcerates approximately 2.3 million people on any given day, as of 2015.21 The
exponential increase in the U.S. incarcerated population created the social phenomenon referred to as "mass incarceration. 22
In order to understand the challenges of mass incarceration and the subsequent
attempt to address such issues through the creation of drug courts, it is first
necessary to understand what caused the exponential growth in the incarcerated
population in the first place. While several factors contributed to state and federal
prison population growth over the past few decades,23 scholars and policymakers primarily blame the War on Drugs.2 4 Announced in the 1970s under
President Richard Nixon and expanded by every U.S. President since, the War on
Drugs changed the scope and face of the American criminal justice system. The
War on Drugs, as part of a larger-scale war on crime, transformed justice systems
with its "tough on crime" approach to all offenders, and drug offenders in
particular.26 State and federal legislators passed new laws providing funding to

20. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULLETIN, PRISONERS 1925 81 tbl.1 (1982), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/p2581.pdf (reporting 196,092 prisoners in federal and state institutions in 1972); CARSON, supra note 2, at 2
tbl.1 (reporting 1,613,803 prisoners in federal and state prisons in 2010).
21. See Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2015, PRISON POLICY
INITIATIVE (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2015.html.
22. For detailed background on the origin of the term mass incarceration, see JONATHAN SIMON, MASS
INCARCERATION ON TRIAL 3 (2014). For examples of its prevalent use, see id.; Eaglin, supra note 9, at 191 n.7.
23. See Michael M. O'Hear, Mass Incarceration in Three Midwestern States: Origins and Trends, 47 VAL.
U. L. REV. 709, 710 17 (2013) (surveying various theories for the national increase in its prison population);
OLIVER ROEDER ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT CAUSED THE CRIME DECLINE? 15-41 (2015) (measuring
the potential impact of various theories on the increasing prison population).
24. See, e.g., TRAVIS ETAL., supra note 8, at 118 (explaining the shift towards harsher criminal justice policies
in the U.S. and noting that "the war on drugs... has been an important contributor to higher U.S. rates of
incarceration"); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 81 (1995)
(noting that drug offenses are "the single most important cause of the trebling of the prison population in the
United States since 1980").
25. See MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A 25-YEAR QUAGMIRE: THE WAR ON DRUGS
AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 1 (2007); Inside the "War on Drugs," HARV. MAG. (Mar. 28, 2013),
http://harvardmagazine.com/2013/03/inside-the-war-on-drugs; Tracie Mauriello, Obama Seeks More Funding to
Fight War on Drugs, PITt. POST GAZETTE (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/nation/2015/02/06/
Obama-asks-Congress-for-more-funding-to-fight-war-on-drugs/stories/201502060156.
26. See general TRAVIS, supra note 8, at 118 (explaining the shift towards harsher criminal justice policies in
the U.S. and noting that "the war on drugs ... has been an important contributor to higher U.S. rates of
incarceration"); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 48 57 (2010) (describing the passage of severe crime legislation between the 1980s and mid-1990s with a
focus on drug legislation in particular); see also Jonathan Simon, Ian Haney Lopez & Mary Louise Frampton,
Introduction, in AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME: RACE, DEMOCRACY AND A NEW RECONSTRUCTION 1, 7 (Mary Louise
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buttress local and state police anti-drug enforcement, incentivizing more arrests
and prosecutions of drug offenders.2 7 Federal legislation decreased judicial discretion in determining criminal penalties by implementing expansive mandatory
minimum penalties to get tough on high-level drug trafficking and violent
offenses. 28 As a result, the War on Drugs is attributed with increasing sentencing
severity and increasing police and prosecutorial discretion. 29 These policies also
opened the door to exacerbated racial disparities at every stage of the criminal
justice system.30 As a result, the War on Drugs-and mass incarceration-is
associated with vast racial inequity as well.3 1

The dramatic expansion of the penal state provides minimal benefits that are
accompanied by unsustainable economic costs. Studies demonstrate that increased
incarceration had little effect on the drop in crime in the past thirty years. 32 At the
same time, however, the massive increase in incarceration costs billions of dollars
to maintain-by 2015, taxpayers spent $260 billion to sustain the criminal justice
system. 33 Mass incarceration requires a large increase in the amount of money
allocated to corrections, which results in decreases in funding for other government responsibilities that affect the broader public, like education.34 Additionally,

Frampton, Ian Haney Lopez & Jonathan Simon eds., 2008) ("[T]he war on crime transmogrified from campaign
tactic to one of the most far-reaching social experiments in this country.").
27. See Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program, 42 U.S.C. § 3751(a) (subsidizing military
equipment for state and local police); INIMAI CHETTIAR ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, REFORMING FUNDING

TO REDUCE MASS INCARCERATION 4 (2013) (explaining how the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant
Program created a funding stream that inadvertently generated incentives to increase arrests, prosecutions, and
incarcerations); NICOLE FORTIER & INIMAI CHETTIAR, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, SUCCESS-ORIENTED FUNDING:

REFORMING FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE GRANTS (2015) ("Today, a complex web of federal crime-fighting grants
funnels billions of dollars across the country ... to encourage states to increase arrests, prosecutions, and
incarceration, all in the belief that harsher punishment would better control crime."); see also ALEXANDER, supra
note 26, at 72 73 (describing the funding incentives for local police forces to add a "military component" to their
drug enforcement tactics, including proliferation of narcotic task forces and the use of military intelligence and
equipment).
28. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846, 851 (2015) (designed to punish serious drug traffickers more severely
based upon drug weight in their possession); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4
(2011) (describing how simple drug violations are used to punish violent felons).
29. See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 28, 2-4 (expanding discretion); ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 60, 86 87
(increasing police and prosecutorial discretion).
30. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 26.
31. See id.; STUNTZ, supra note 28, at 4-5.
32. Since 1990, the violent and property crime rates have decreased considerably, while incarceration has
increased. ROEDER ET AL., supra note 23, at 7 (noting that violent crime declined by 50% since 1990, property
crime declined by 46%, and imprisonment increased by 61%). At best, incarceration contributed to 7% of the
crime decrease from 1990-1999, and only 1% of the crime decline from 2000-2013 can be attributed to
incarceration. Id. at 6.
33. LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & INIMAI CHETTIAR, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE REVERSE MASS INCARCERATION ACT 1 (2015). Total criminal justice spending in 1986 was just $53.5 billion. Id. at 16 n.5.

34. See, e.g., NAACP, MISPLACED PRIORITIES: OVER INCARCERATE, UNDER EDUCATE 1 (2011), http://naacp.3cdn.
net/Old6f36Sedbe135234_bqom68x5h.pdf ("Over the last two decades, as the criminal justice system came to
assume a larger proportion of state discretionary dollars nationwide, state spending on prisons grew at six times
the rate of state spending on higher education.").
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prison systems across the country suffer from overcrowding because more people
are incarcerated than the systems can currently maintain. Similarly, criminal
court systems are overburdened, leading to delayed administration of justice.36
The social costs of mass incarceration are unsustainable as well. Those incarcerated are at high-risk of re-incarceration in the future. 7 Isolation from society
through barriers to employment, voter disenfranchisement, and exclusion from
public housing-additionally prevents successful reentry to society. 38 Mass incarceration negatively affects whole urban communities, not just those individuals
entangled in the justice system. 39 For example, traditional family structures are
weakened and democratic power is diluted as significant portions of specific
communities are removed. 40 These realities have a destabilizing effect that creates

35. Notoriously, California's prison overcrowding problem led to the Supreme Court's 2011 decision affirming
a lower court order for the state to reduce its prison population pursuant to the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 50 (2011). The state still struggles to meet
the requirements imposed on it, and numerous other states suffer from similar, though not as visible,
overcrowding issues. See Reid Wilson, Prisons in these 17 States are Over Capacity, WASH. POST (Sept. 20,
2014), https://www. washingtonpost.c m/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/09/20/prisons-in-these- 177-states-are-filledover-capacity/. This includes the federal system. See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM:
JUSTICE COULD BETTER MEASURE PROGRESS ADDRESSING INCARCERATION CHALLENGES 1 (2015), http://www.gao.
gov/assets/680/670896.pdf ("[D]espite a decline of about 8,500 inmates since the end of fiscal year 2013 ... [The
Federal Bureau of Prisons] reports that its institutions remain about 30 percent overcrowded, housing considerably more inmates than they were designed to hold.").
36. See, e.g., Melanie Batley, Courts Overwhelmed as Immigration ProsecutionsSet to Triple, NEWSMAX (Apr.
24, 2013), http://www.newsmax.com/t/newsmax/article/501140; William Glaberson, FalteringCourts, Mired in
Delays, N.Y TIMES (Apr. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/nyregion/justice-denied-bronx-courtsystem-mired-in-delays.html ("[J]ustice delayed is justice denied."); Stephen Labaton, New Tactics in the War on
Drugs Tilt Scales of Justice Off Balance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/29/us/newtactic s-in-the-war-on-drugs-tilt- scales-of-justice-off-balance.html
37. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30
STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010 1 (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf;
Klingele, supra note 12, at 548-49 (describing the risks of reincarceration and distinguishing those risks from
recidivism due to the commission of a new crime); ROEDER ET AL., supra note 23, at 25 (describing the
criminogenic effect of mass incarceration, meaning that prison "can increase the criminal behavior of prisoners
upon release").
38. See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Mass Imprisonment and Disappearing Votes, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 50, 57 (2002) (felon disenfranchisement); White House,

Fact Sheet: White House Launches the Fair Chance Business Pledge, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 11, 2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/1 1/fact-sheet-white-house-launches-fair-chancebusiness-pledge (recognizing barriers to employment for those with criminal records); MARIE CLAIRE
TRAN-LEUNG, SARGENT SHRIVER NAT'L CTR. ON POVERTY LAW, WHEN DISCRETION MEANS DENIAL: NATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL RECORDS BARRIERS TO FEDERALLY SUBSIDIZED HOUSING (2015), http://povertylaw.org/
sites/default/files/images/publications/WDMD-final.pdf (discussing overly restrictive criminal records policies
that prevent the formerly incarcerated from obtaining public housing).
39. TODD R. CLEAR & NATASHA FROST, THE PUNISHMENT IMPERATIVE: THE RISE AND FAILURE OF MASS

INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 26 27 (2014) (describing the concentration of incarceration among young black
males from impoverished inner-city neighborhoods).
40. See Klingele, supra note 12, at 549; TODD CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION
MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007); Sarah Childress, Todd Clear: Why America's Mass

IncarcerationExperiment Failed,FRONTLINE (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/todd-clear-
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a paradoxical reality whereby more incarceration can create more crime as well.41
In short, mass incarceration creates detrimental effects on society that cannot be
maintained in the long-term; whatever benefits were previously experienced by
this phenomenon are quickly being outweighed by its increasing costs.
Well-intentioned judges and practitioners identified the detrimental effects of
mass incarceration first, and responded to the social and economic pressures
created by the War on Drugs with the creation of the drug court. 4 2 "Drug courts"
refer to a variety of diversionary programs, run through criminal courts, which
divert certain drug offenders from standard sentences and instead require participation in drug treatment programs.43 Regardless of the drug court model chosen, the
ultimate goal of drug courts is to provide certain offenders with treatment to cure
their drug addiction-the rationale being that successful treatment will stop the
cycle of "drug use and associated criminal behavior." 44 The process is nonadversarial; several actors of the criminal justice system work together to identify
and assign the offender to treatment as an alternative to incarceration.45 The judge
plays an active and integral role in connecting the offender to a treatment program
and monitors the progress of the offender through that treatment regimen.46 Where
the offender is successful in treatment, the court will grant rewards.47 Completion
of the drug court program results in either the dismissal of charges (preadjudication model) or a no-time sentence on pleas to lesser charges (post-

why-americas-mass-incarceration-experiment-failed/ (discussing how crime and incarceration are concentrated
in urban areas, and removal of so many people from communities has a destabilizing effect on those left behind).
41. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Crack Cocaine, Congressional Inaction, and Equal Protection, 37 HARV.J.L. &
PUB. PoL'Y 241, 290 (2014) (observing that the destabilizing effect of mass incarceration "erodes a community's
ability to maintain the informal social controls serving as the first line of defense against crime and discord"); see
also ROEDER ET AL., supra note 23, at 27 (finding that "8 of the 10 states that experienced increases in violent
crime in the 2000s also saw increases in imprisonment").
42. Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 417, 421 (2009).
43. Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial Interventionism, 65
OHIO ST.L. J. 1479, 1481, 1489 (2004) (drug courts may offer pre- or post-trial intervention to divert offenders
from sentences of incarceration).
44. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government,
53 VAND. L. REv. 831, 870 71 (2000) ("[Drug] treatment courts use coercion as only one of many tools in helping
the addict cope with his addiction ....[D]rug courts represent as effective a response to the problem of addiction
as possible under current law."); Breaking the Cycle of Drugs and Crime, OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY
(1999), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/policy/99ndcs/iv-d.html ("Drug courts seek to reduce
drug use and associated criminal behavior by retaining drug-involved offenders in treatment."); Eaglin, supra
note 9, at 209.
45. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 44, at 845.
46. Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REv. 783, 784 (2008).
47. Rewards may include encouragement and praise from the bench, ceremonies to acknowledge completion
of different stages in the process, and tokens of progress. See Miller, supra note 43, at 1498 99 (internal citations
omitted); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 44, at 870-71. Oppositely, sanctions for noncompliance that come short of
incarceration will also be issued. These may include verbal warnings and admonishment from the bench in open
court, demotion to a previous stage, or confinement in the courtroom or jury box. Miller, supra note 43, at 1497,
1499.
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adjudication model).48 Where the offender fails to adequately progress in the
program, though, the court imposes graduated sanctions. 49 Failure to complete the
program ultimately results in a return to the traditional criminal justice system,
where offenders may receive longer punishment terms than those offenders who
declined to enter drug court at all.50
While drug courts vary in form, most share two main characteristics relevant to
this Article. First, drug courts limit eligibility by defined characteristics. 51 Due to
limited resources and capacity, drug courts are available for only a small subset of
the offender population. Eligibility for drug courts varies, but generally the courts
accept low-level, nonviolent drug offenders.5 2 In this instance, "low-level" tends
to refer to both first-time offenders and those offenders who are charged with drug
possession offenses.5 3 Few courts accept offenders charged with non-possession
drug-related crimes.5 4 In addition, offenders with prior convictions for violent
felonies are typically screened out of drug courts. Prosecutors and judges
preclude offenders with long or serious criminal records due to concern about their
48. Bowers, supra note 46, at 784.
49. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 44, at 847-48 (drug courts impose graduated sanctions in the event of relapse or
other rule infractions). Graduated sanctions may include increased surveillance through treatment sessions, status
hearings, urine tests, and even incarceration for a period of days. Id. at 848; Miller, supra note 43, at 1499.
50. Eaglin, supra note 9, at 218 19; Bowers, supra note 46, at 792 ("[T]he sentences for failing participants in
New York City drug courts were typically two-to-five times longer than the sentences for conventionally
adjudicated defendants.").
51. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, DEHNING DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS 5 (2004),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bja/205621.pdf (explaining in Component 3 that "[e]ligible participants are
identified early and promptly placed in the drug court program"); Miller, supra note 43, at 1539 ("All drug courts
use some form of screening procedure to weed out classes of offenders as unsuitable or ineligible for the
rehabilitation program.").
52. Bowers, supra note 46, at 784 (noting that drug courts' general operating pattern includes "participation of
nonviolent drug offenders").
53. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 166/20(b) (2016) (excluding defendants charged with crimes of violence
or convicted of crimes of violence in the last ten years); NPC RESEARCH, INDIANA DRUG COURTS: A SUMMARY OF
EVALUATION FINDINGS IN FIVE ADULT PROGRAMS (2007), http://npcresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/Indiana-Drug-

Courts-All-Site-Summary-FINAL1.pdf (drug courts targeting nonviolent, non-dealing drug related or non-drug
related offenders). But see RYAN S. KING & JILL PASQUARELLA, SENTENCING PROJECT, DRUG COURTS: A REVIEW OF
THE EVIDENCE 3 (2009), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/dp-drugcourts.pdf (eligibility for drug courts
tends to require that the defendant is charged with drug possession or nonviolent offense, and excludes persons
with current or prior violent offenses); JESSICA EAGLIN & DANYELLE SOLOMON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
REDUCING RACALAND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN LOCAL JAILS 31 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/defaultU

files/publications/Racial%20Disparities%2OReport%20062515.pdf ("[M]any diversion programs are limited to
individuals who committed first time and low level offenses.").
54. Bowers, supra note 46, at 794 n.41 (noting the exceptional nature of New York City drug courts accepting
drug dealers into their programs); Michael M. O'Hear, Rethinking Drug Courts: Restorative Justice as a
Response to Racial Injustice, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 463, 478 79 (2009) (noting that eligibility requirements
typically may exclude those defendants with "ancillary nondrug charges," prior convictions for violent felonies,
or drug distribution charges).
55. Miller, supra note 43, at 1539-40. Screening happens twice: first when the prosecutor refers the defendant
to the drug court, and second when the drug treatment provider decides to accept the defendant into a program.
Eligibility criteria are statutorily proscribed, but providers have discretion to further narrow the eligibility criteria
for a specific program. Id. at 1539-42; see sources cited supra note 53.
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supervision in the community.5 6 Drug treatment providers tend to exclude such
offenders because they are less likely to successfully complete the program. 5,7
Demonstrating effectiveness is a central component of a drug court.58 While
traditional courts measure effectiveness through case processing time, number of
cases, time to disposition, and the like, 59 drug courts point to statistical data as the

primary evidence of their success-specifically focusing on recidivism reduction
and cost. 60 Programs invite evaluators to measure their outcomes. 6 1 The argument
surrounding how much these programs reduce the likelihood of recidivism
revolves around data.62 Advocates use cost-effectiveness as a measure of success
for court implementation.6 3 Comparing criminal justice dollars spent on drug
courts with the cost of other programs and/or incarceration is common in analyzing
the relative effectiveness of drug court programs.64
Drug courts have garnered widespread support from both conservatives and
progressives for converging reasons. Conservatives are drawn to the "tough love"

56. See Miller, supra note 43, at 1539 ("Most courts.., screen out offenders with a history of violent
crime... [or] those who have engaged in drug dealing rather than drug use."); ROGER H. PETERS & ELIZABETH
PEYTON, GUIDELINES FOR DRUG COURTS SCREENING AND ASSESSMENT 10 (1998), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/

bja/171143.pdf (prosecutors and judges involved in first level screening and placement of defendants in drug
court programs).
57. See Eaglin, supra note 9, at 209; Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug CourtScandal,78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1462
(2000); Miller, supra note 43, at 1541-42 (noting that treatment programs have little incentive to admit into the
program offenders who will not actually complete it); see also Richard C. Boldt, The "Tomahawk" and the
"Healing Balm": Drug Treatment Courts in Theory and Practice, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER &
CLASS 45, 54 55 (2010) (offenders with fewer prior involvements in the criminal system are more likely to
complete drug court programs).
58. See generally DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, NAT'LASS'N OF DRUG COURT PROF'LS, RESEARCH UPDATE ON ADULT
DRUG COURTS (2010), http://www.nadcp.org/sites/default/files/nadcp/Research%20Update%2Oon%2OAdult%20
Drug%20Courts%20-%20NADCP-1.pdf (discussing evidence that drug courts significantly reduce drug use and
crime).
59. RACHEL PORTER ET AL.,

CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, WHAT MAKES A COURT PROBLEM-SOLVING?:

UNIVERSAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE 20 (2010), http://www.courtinnovation.org/

sites/default/files/WhatMakes A CourtP S.pdf.
60. See, e.g., The Verdict Is In: Drug Courts Work, NAT'L ASS'N DRUG COURT PROF'LS, http://www.nadcp.org/
learn/how-well-do-drug-courts-work/facts-figures (last visited Apr. 14, 2016) (pointing to cost savings ranging
from $3,000 to $13,000 per client diverted from prison; citing to studies demonstrating seventy-five percent of
drug court graduates remain arrest-free for two years after leaving the program).
61. See The Verdict Is In: Drug Courts Work, supranote 60, which notes that:
Our nation's scientific community put Drug Courts under its microscope. After all of their rigorous
testing and research they concluded that Drug Courts work. Better than jail or prison. Better than
probation or treatment alone. Drug Courts significantly reduce drug use and crime and are more
cost-effective than any other proven criminal justice strategy.
Id.
62. See JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 128 29 (2003);
Hoffman, supra note 57, at 1485.
63. Hoffman, supra note 57, at 1480.
64. See ROBERT V. WOLF, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, CALIFORNIA'S COLLABORATIVE JUSTICE COURTS:
BUILDING A PROBLEM-SOLVING JUDICIARY 3 (2005), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/defaul/files/CA%20

Storyl .pdf.
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aspect of drug courts-in other words, the "this is still punishment" aspect of the
courts and their ability to use incarceration and other methods to induce specific
behavior.> Progressives are drawn to the programs because they reintroduce an
aspect of rehabilitation into American penal practice.66 The use of scientificallydriven data on the drug courts' effectiveness at reducing both recidivism and costs
appeals to all politicians, regardless of political leanings, because it provides a
depoliticized platform to address drug crimes.67 The rhetoric focuses on how these
programs place responsibility on the individual to alter his or her conduct. 68
Defendants are expected to transform in their home communities, regardless of
external social ills. The rhetoric does not place an onus on the government to
address the politically-divisive underlying social and economic ills exacerbated by
mass incarceration.6 9
Drug courts have proliferated in the United States as a successful model of
criminal justice reform. Between 1990 and 2000, more than two thousand drug
courts were established in jurisdictions across the United States.7 0 Today, there are
nearly three thousand drug courts in the United States.7 1 These courts are generally
considered a leading alternative to incarceration. 2 Drug courts also serve as a
model-either in strategy or in implementation-for numerous other problemoriented courts.7 3 Mental health courts, domestic violence courts, community
courts, homeless courts, truancy courts, reentry courts, and veterans' courts all

65. Miller, supra note 42, at 425; Aliyah Frumin, In 2016 Race, Drug Courts Get Second Look, MSNBC (Aug.
25, 2015), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/amid-2016-election-drug-courts-get-closer-look ("[D]rug courts aren't
all handholding and hugs.").
66. Miller, supra note 42, at 425; see, e.g., Cory Booker, End of One-Size-Fits-All Sentencing, in BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, SOLUTIONS: AMERICAN LEADERS SPEAK OUT ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7, 8 (Inimai Chettiar &

Michael Waldman eds., 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Solutions-AmericanLeadersSpeak Out On CriminalJustice.pdf ("Or we could spend this money [used to incarcerate] to empower
those who break the law from the drug addicted to youth offenders to succeed.").
67. Miller, supra note 42, at 427; see also Frumin, supra note 65.
68. David Garland describes this as a "responsibilization" strategy. GARLAND, supra note 16, at 124. "The
primary objective [of the responsibilization strategy] is to spread responsibility for crime control onto agencies,
organizations, and individuals that operate outside the criminal justice state and to persuade them to act
appropriately." Id. at 124-25. Eric Miller applies this analysis to drug courts. He argues that the responsibilization
aspect of drug courts explains why both conservatives and progressives embrace these programs as a response to
mass incarceration. Miller, supra note 42, at 425 27.
69. Miller, supra note 42, at 425 27.
70. NAT'L DRUG COURT INST., TIMELINE OF DRUG COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS IN THE UNITED

STATES (2008), http://www.nadcp.org/sites/default/files/nadcp/Timeline.pdf.
71. There are currently 2,734 drug courts in the United States. Types of Drug Courts, NAT'L ASS'N OF DRUG
COURT PROF'LS, http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/models (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
72. See Roger K. Warren, A Tale of Two Surveys: Judicial and Public Perspectives on State Sentencing
Reforms, 21 FED. SENT'G REP. 276, 277 (2009) (noting that a 2006 survey by the National Center for State Courts
described the expansion of drug courts as "among the leading current sentencing reform efforts in the states").
73. See John S. Goldkamp, The Drug Court Response: Issues and Implicationsfor Justice Change, 63 ALB. L.
REV. 923, 929 (2000) ("The drug court methodology has been adapted to grapple with other problems associated
with court populations, including community issues, domestic violence, and mental health, and has directly and
indirectly spawned a variety of related innovations .... ").
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acknowledge the influential role of drug courts in their formation.74
II. THE DRUG COURT PARADIGM AND SENTENCING REFORMS TO ADDRESS
MASS INCARCERATION

Though drug courts are considered a leading response, states have implemented
a variety of sentencing reforms in the last decade to address the fiscal and political
pressures of mass incarceration. This Article argues that these reforms generally
approach mass incarceration through a particular frame derived from drug courts
and herein referred to as the "drug court paradigm." "Framing" is "an active,
processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality
construction. 75 Said differently, the way a social issue is framed shapes reality,
because the frame influences normative decisions concerning how to define a
problem and how to select a solution.76 This Article asserts that the drug court
paradigm extends beyond framing how to address drug addiction; it also shapes
how lawmakers conceptualize the problems of and solutions to mass incarceration
more broadly.
The contours of the drug court paradigm are simple: low-level, nonviolent
offenders should not be incarcerated for long terms because it is neither costefficient nor an effective method of punishing them. This frame drives the success
of drug courts; it also shapes other policy reforms designed to reduce reliance on
incarceration at the state and federal level. Three aspects from the drug court
movement define the paradigm: "low-level offenders," "nonviolent offenders,"
and "effectiveness."
"Low-level" signifies several different types of offenders. The Uniform Crime
Report's delineation between Part I and Part II offenses serves as a general proxy
for "serious" versus "low-level" offenses. 77 Part I offenses include "serious violent

and property" crimes such as criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated
assault, burglary and larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. 78 Part II, or
"less serious," offenses include fraud, embezzlement, drug abuse (possession and

74. See id. at 950461.
75. Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and
Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. Soc. 611, 614 (2000).
76. Id. at 614 n.3.
77. See Thomas Cohen et al., Nat'l Ctr. For State Courts, Examining the Work of State Courts: A Renewed
Interest in Low-Level Crime, 6 CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2000), http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/
collection/criminal/id/40.
78. Id.

at 5; FED.

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES,

2009 OFFENSE DEFINITIONS (2010) [hereinafter CRIME IN THE U.S. 2009], https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/
abo4ut/offense definitions.html. For these offenses, law enforcement submit information to the Uniform Crime
Reporting Program on the number of offenses known by police, the number of offenses cleared by arrest or
exceptional means, and the age, sex, and race of each person arrested for the offense.
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trafficking), weapons (carrying and possessing), and prostitution, among others.79
Despite this categorization, low-level offenders are commonly understood as
something different from low-level offenses. Recent sentencing policy changes
delineate between "low-level" offenders as opposed to "serious" offenders. 80 The
general understanding of "low-level" includes nonviolent drug offenders, though
the scope of the term has been used to incorporate numerous other types of
offenders and offenses. At times, loitering, drug trafficking, and theft may be
considered "low-level." The connotation associated with this term is that such
offenders do not necessarily threaten public safety, but are incarcerated
nonetheless.81
"Nonviolent offenders only" is another characteristic of the drug court paradigm. Drug courts excluded violent offenders initially as a measure to encourage
political buy in.8 2 The exclusionary nature of drug courts similarly extends to most
specialized courts. 3 Admittance of violent offenders to any specialized court is the
exception, not the rule.8 4 Legislatures and policymakers are now following the
lead in efforts
to divert only low-level, nonviolent drug offenders from
85
incarceration.
Finally, "effectiveness" is an important feature of the drug court paradigm. Drug
courts justified their existence and expansion on the basis that it is more effective
than long-term incarceration both in cost and in reducing recidivism. 8 6 Today,
criminal justice reforms are driven by the larger shift towards "evidence-based
policies and practices," or EBPPs. EBPPs use empirically researched approaches
to criminal justice that are proven to have measurable, positive outcomes that

79. Cohen, et al., supra note 77, at 5; CRIME IN THE U.S. 2009, supra note 78. For Part II offenses, law
enforcement need only report the number of arrests conducted monthly to the Uniform Crime Report Program.
CRIME IN THE U.S. 2009, supra note 78.
80. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12, at 165 66; Christopher Seeds, BifurcationNation: Strategy in Contemporary American Punishment (June 1, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id-2613083; Eaglin, supra note 9, at 211 14.
81. See, e.g., President Barack H. Obama, Remarks by the President at the NAACP Conference (July 14,
2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/remarks-president-naacp-conference (focusing
on unnecessary incarceration of low level, nonviolent drug offenders).
82. See McLeod, supra note 13, at 1625 ("[I]n the view of some advocates, 'in many cases, the current system
works just fine' such as in handling 'murders, rapes, and robberies;' they believed that alternatives for prosecution
of more serious offenses would be inappropriate.") (internal citations omitted).
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Erica Goode, Coming Together to Fight for a Troubled Veteran, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/18/us/18vets.html; McLeod, supra note 13, at 1606 08 (describing variety of
eligibility requirements for admission to different specialized courts, and noting that some courts admit
defendants with serious felony records while others do not).
85. See EAGLIN & SOLOMON, supra note 53, at 30 31 (discussing the prevalence of eligibility requirements for
diversion programs designed to keep low level offenders out of jail and prison); GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12, at
165 (discussing the rise of reforms that address non-violent, non-serious, non-sex offenders only).
86. NOLAN, supra note 62, at 58 59 (noting that utilitarian sentiments such as cost-effectiveness remain a
major source of structural explanation and justification for the drug court movement); supra notes 64 68.
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promote public safety.8 7 Such policies and practices are measured according to
their cost-effectiveness and their ability to reduce recidivism. These measures
increase the government's efficiency and its ability to ensure public safety by
reducing risk of future criminal behavior that threatens society at large. The shift
towards EBPP is a critical part of the drug court paradigm. As the following
subsections will demonstrate, the two prongs of effectiveness-cost-effectiveness
and reduced recidivism rate-once used to justify drug courts are now used to
legitimize and advance criminal justice policy reforms more broadly.
Having established the key aspects of the drug court paradigm, the following
Parts provide examples of recent sentencing reforms shaped by the drug court
paradigm. Part A discusses reforms adopted in the "Justice Reinvestment Initiative" states, meaning states where the Justice Reinvestment Initiative entered to
review and propose sentencing policies to reduce pressures created by mass
incarceration. Part B discusses reform efforts in California. Part C discusses
criminal justice reforms at the federal level.
A. "JusticeReinvestment Initiative" States
Originating in 2001, the Justice Reinvestment Initiative ("JRI") is a joint
public-private coalition of the U.S. Department of Justice, the Pew Charitable
Trust, the Center for State Governments, and the Vera Institute of Justice. 8 This
coalition analyzes state data, recommends ways to reduce prison populations, and
"generate[s] savings for reinvestment in local high incarceration communities .... "9 JRI also helps state policymakers quantify savings for reinvestment in
affected communities, as well as other prevention-oriented strategies. 90 In 2004,
the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance provided financial
support to allow JRI to expand its reach by offering technical assistance to states
interested in reducing their prison populations. 91 In 2010, Congress further
endorsed JRI, providing increased funding through the 2010 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act. 92 The savings realized by JRI reforms theoretically will
be "reinvested in evidence-based efforts to support additional public safety

87. See, e.g., PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING: A GUIDE FOR EFFECTIVE GOVERN-

2
(2014),
http://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2014/1 l/evidencebasedpolicymakingaguide
foreffectivegovernment.pdf (endorsing EBPP as the future of government); Evidence-Based Policies and
Practices,N.Y.C. DEP'T OF PROBATION, http://www.nyc.gov/html/prob/html/about/evidence.shtml (describing the
DOP's shift towards EBPP).
88. Klingele, supra note 12, at 539.
89. AUSTIN ETAL., supra note 6, at 6.
90. See Justice Reinvestment Initiative, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, https://www.bja.gov/programs/
justicereinvestmendbackground.html (last visited May 5, 2016).
MENT

91. See NANCY LAVIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE STATE ASSESSMENT REPORT 6

(2014), http://www.urban.orgUploadedPDF/412994-Justice-Reinvestment-Initiative-State-Assessment-Report.
pdf.
92. Id. at 6.
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improvements" in those communities.9 3
By 2014, JRI has assisted twenty-seven states in addressing growing prison
populations. 94 Eighteen of these states have implemented JRI legislation.95 JRI's
collection of data and recommendations continually proved pivotal to the passage
of reforms that stabilized state prison population growth. Though each state
receives an individualized assessment on the local dynamics driving prison
growth, the recommendations for solutions tend to be similar. Typically, JRI urges
states to adopt EBPPs, including the use of risk and needs assessments,9 6
problem-solving courts,97 graduated sanctions,9 8 and programs to monitor and
measure effectiveness.9 9 These policies are designed to specifically "improve the
efficiency of [a state's] criminal justice system and allocate limited justice system
resources effectively." lOO
JRI strategically focuses on low-level, nonviolent offenders in its data collection
and recommendation process. Since its inception, the initiative targeted "low
hanging fruit[s]" to attract bipartisan support, a key element to the initiative's
success.1 O From 2002 to 2008, this included back-end reforms, such as reducing

93. See Klingele, supra note 12, at 563464 (citing LAVIGNE ETAL., supra note 91, at 3) (noting that the savings
come from "averted operating costs as a result of incarcerating a smaller population and averted construction
costs as a result of not having to build new facilities to incarcerate larger justice system populations").
94. The twenty-seven states participating in JRI are as follows: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 1 n.1.
95. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 1 n. 1 (listing the eighteen states that have implemented JRI legislation).
96. "Risk and needs assessments" have been adopted in sixteen JRI states. Id. (listing these sixteen states).
These assessments "help predict a person's risk to reoffend through the identification of criminal risk factors."
LAVIGNE ET AL., supra note 91, at 2. The assessments, derived from statistical data on characteristics of offenders
in the prison population, are used to inform decisions about detention, sentencing, release and allocation of
supervision and treatment resources. See id.
97. Six JRI states have created or expanded problem-solving courts. These courts "use an evidence-based
approach to provide treatment for offenders with specific needs," usually related to substance abuse (drug courts)
or mental health disorders (mental health courts). LAVIGNE ET AL., supra note 91, at 2. In addition, eleven JRI
states have developed or expanded "community based treatment" programs. Though not exactly the same, these
programs also focus on providing treatment (e.g., substance abuse treatment) to offenders in the community. Id.
98. "Intermediate and graduate sanctions" provide alternatives to long terms of incarceration for technical
violations of probation or parole. Id. Technical violations refer to violations of the terms of community
supervision that do not encompass the commission of new crimes, so instances where offenders fail drug tests or
fail to attend probation officer meetings. These alternative "graduated" responses include short jail stays,
increased drug testing, or other interventions that introduce accountability and certainty of punishment without
sending offenders directly to prison. Fifteen JRI states have adopted these types of reforms. See id.
99. Other programs may include introduction of accountability measures like mandatory reporting, ensuring
use of EBPPs, and developing data reporting requirements. See id.; Evidence-Based Practices, JUST.REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE, https://www.bja.gov/programs/justicereinvestmentevidence-based-practice.html (last visited
Mar. 8, 2016).
100. Evidence-BasedPractices, supra note 99.
101. AUSTIN ETAL., supra note 6, at 6.
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technical parole violation revocations and re-establishing good time credits. 102 For
example, Texas and Kansas, two states celebrated for their prison population
reductions with JRI, both adopted reforms focused on reducing recidivism amongst
offenders. In Kansas, 2007 legislation focused on reducing technical violations by
offenders who were on community supervision. The legislation introduced risk
assessment instruments to identify medium- and high-risk offenders, created
intermediate sanctions, and incentivized creation of evidence-based community
correction services, including drug and mental health treatment program. 10 3 In
Texas, the reforms focused on creating non-incarcerative alternative sanctions for
technical violations of parole or probation, increasing drug and mental health
treatment programs in prisons, and shifting certain offenders from prisons to
jails. 104
Consistent with the drug court paradigm, the focus on low-level, nonviolent
offenders continued as the initiative grew in popularity. For example, South
Carolina adopted sentencing reforms that aimed to reduce its low-level, nonviolent
offender population. 1 0 5 The state adopted JRI-recommended reforms, like integrated risk assessment tools, into probation and parole supervision practices.'10 6 It
also eliminated mandatory minimum penalties for drug possession. 10 7 Georgia
adopted JRI-recommended reforms focused on diverting lower-level offenders as
well.10 8 There, Georgia lawmakers enacted JRI legislation in 2012 that revised
penalties for certain drug offenses, expanded problem-oriented courts, and introduced graduated degrees of burglary and forgery levels for theft offenses.10 9 The
legislation should stabilize Georgia's prison population growth.110

102. See id. (citing to multiple states in which this occurred, including Arizona (2008); Connecticut (2004);
Kansas (2007) (technical violations); Rhode Island (2008); Texas (2007) (technical violations and good time
credits)).
103. See S.B. 14 § 1(b), 2007 2008 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2007).
104. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE: STATES REDUCING INCARCERATION
RATES

AND

COSTS

WHILE

PROTECTING

COMMUNITIES,

20 21

(2011), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/

smartreformispossible.pdf; see also Eaglin, supra note 9, at 206 ("[Texas reforms included] assigning nonviolent
offenders to mental health and drug treatment programs instead of prison, placing those serving less than two
years in short-term jails, and engaging in early intervention .... ").
105. Success Stories, JUST. REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE, https://www.bja.gov/programs/justicereinvestmentU
success stories.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2016).
106. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 104, at 9.

107. See Act 273, 2009-2010 Leg., 118th Sess. (S.C. 2010).
108. Georgia, JUST. REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE, https://www.bja.gov/programs/justicereinvestmentgeorgia.
html (last visited Mar. 9, 2016) (JRI developed policies to "focus[] on reserving prison beds for serious
offenders").
109. H.B. 1176 § 2, 2011 2012 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2012) (drug and mental health courts and treatment
programs); § 3 (introducing graduated degrees for burglary and several forms of theft); § 3 7 (revising penalties
for offenses).
110. Georgia, supra note 108 (estimating a reduction from 55,933 prisoners in FY 2012 to 54,690 prisoners in
FY 2018, while averting the anticipated eight percent increase).
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In Indiana, JRI's efforts failed to result in specific legislation, despite efforts to
push sentencing reforms within the JRI framework. 1 1 There, JRI entered the state
in 2009. In 2010, the Council of State Governments Justice Center released a
report suggesting that too many low-level offenders were incarcerated in the state
of Indiana.1 1 2 Following the report's recommendations, the Indiana state legislature introduced legislation that created a graduated sentencing structure for drug
possession and dealing offenses, expanded problem-solving courts, and incorporated risk assessment tools in probation determinations.1 1 3 Shortly thereafter, the
Indiana University Public Policy Institute released a report on the types of
offenders affected by the legislation. 1 4 The report indicated that most of these
offenders were repeat offenders.1 1 5 Prosecutors seized upon this data to support
their assertion that offenders benefiting from the legislation should not qualify for
diversion from long terms of incarceration, as these offenders were not "lowlevel." 1 6 Largely due to prosecutorial opposition, the JRI bill failed. 117 In 2014,
the state implemented new reforms that reduced punishment for some drug
offenses, while increasing penalties for habitual and violent offenders. 1 8 Indiana's
reform efforts illustrate the power of the drug court paradigm and the dangers in
breaking from its mold. The JRI reforms failed because the "low-level nonviolent

111. While the entire series of proposed bills did not pass in several states, Indiana is the only state where JRI
developed legislation never passed at all. Compare Indiana, COUNCIL OF ST. Gov'TS JUST. CTR., https://
csgjusticecenter.org/jr/in/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2016) (conceding legislature's failure to adopt any JRI-related
legislation), with, e.g., Michigan, COUNCIL OF ST. Gov'TS JUST. CTR., https://csgjusticecenter.org/jr/mi/ (last
visited Mar. 11, 2016) (recognizing legislation that provided funding for continued analysis of sentencing
practices, but did not encompass any actual sentencing reforms), and Alison Lawrence, Justice Reinvestment:
Wisconsin, NAT'L CONE OF ST.LEGISLATURES (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminaljustice/justice -reinvestment-in-wisconsin.aspx (describing Wisconsin's passage and later repeal of JRI reforms).

112. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT IN INDIANA: SUMMARY REPORT & POLICY FRAMEWORK, COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS
JUSTICE CTR. 2 (2010), http://www.in.gov/legislative/interim/committee/reports/CCECDB 1.pdf.
113. S. 561, ll7th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind.2011).
114. See G. ROGER JARJOURA ET AL., IND. UNIV. CTR. FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH., REVIEW OF IDOC
ADMISSION COHORT OF D FELONY AND SELECT C FELONY OFFENDERS (2012), http://www.policyinstitute.iu.edu/

PubsPDFs/DAWG%20final%20report%20090512.pdf (demonstrating that most offenders are repeat offenders);
see also Jessica M. Eaglin, Neorehabilitationand Indiana'sSentencing Reform Dilemma, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 867,
878 79 (2013).
115. See JARJOURA ET AL., supra note 114, at 4 (finding that "86 percent of D felony cases and 90 percent of C
felony new commitment cases involved offenders with prior community supervision experience").
116. See, e.g., Editorial, Sentencing Reforms Return Under New Indiana Legislation, EVANSVILLE COURIER &
PRESS (Jan. 20, 2013), http://www.courierpress.com/opinion/editorial-sentencing-reform-returns-under-newindiana-legislation-ep-443581789-327264792.html (pointing to prosecutorial opposition to sentencing legislation
as catalyst for bill failure); Eaglin, supra note 114, at 873 74 (detailing prosecutorial opposition to the
JRI-endorsed sentencing legislation in 2012).
117. Indiana,supra note 111.
118. See H. 1006, 118th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013), http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2013/HE/
HE1006.1.html. The bill, which went into effect in July 2014, revised the criminal code and reduced sentences for
fraud, intellectual property, and auto theft offenses. It also permits the courts to reduce or suspend sentences for
some drug offenses. At the same time, the bill created new mandatory penalties, increased the advisory sentence
range for most offenders, and prohibited "credit restricted felons" from obtaining sentence modifications. Id.
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offender" frame did not withstand attack from state prosecutors. New legislation
adopted in the state took a much narrower approach to reform, potentially reducing
sentences for a smaller subset of drug offenders only. 9 It also increased sentence
120
severity for most offenders.
The JRI experience demonstrates the strength of the drug court paradigm. JRI
recommendations address low-level, nonviolent offenders using the rhetoric
of recidivism reduction and cost effectiveness. Unsurprisingly-since JRI sentencing reform is no doubt shaped and affected by the drug court paradigmrecidivism reduction and cost-effectiveness have become central tenets of the
initiative's approach to devising criminal justice reform recommendations. 121
B. California
California is an important state in the battle to reduce mass incarceration in the
122
United States. It has one of the largest state prison populations in the country,
and it adopted some of the most severe sentencing reforms in the country during
the tough-on-crime era. 123 California's struggles to address persistent and systemic
prison overcrowding issues 124 resulted in a 2011 Supreme Court order to reduce
the state's prison population by forty thousand people within two years. 125 The
state introduced a number of reforms to address its mass incarceration problem,
focusing on the expansion of drug courts and implementation of the Public Safety
Realignment Act. 126 More recently, California voters supplemented these efforts
by approving two propositions designed to reduce the state's incarcerated population. This Part analyzes these reforms to demonstrate their general adherence to the
drug court paradigm.

119. House Enrolled Act 1006 reclassified felonies from Class A-D to Level 1-6. The new scheme increased
levels for some violent offenses while decreasing levels for some non-violent offenses. It also increased the
amount of time served for "credit restricted' felons, from fifty percent to seventy-five percent of assigned
sentence. See Ind. Code 35-31.5-2-72 (2016).
120. Id.
121. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 7; Justice Reinvestment, COUNCIL OF STATE GoVTS, JUSTICE CTR.,
http://.csgjusticecenter.org/jr (last visited Mar. 9, 2016).
122. See LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERINN J. HERBERMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012 5 tbl.5 (2013), http://www.bj s.gov/contenUpub/pdf/cpusl2.pdf.
123. See JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL 17 22 (2014) ("California is to incarceration what
Mississippi was to segregation

the state that most exemplifies the social and legal deformities of the practice.").

124. Joan Petersilia, California's CorrectionalParadox of Excess and Deprivation,37 CRIME & JUST. 207,
252 54 (2008) (describing California's "catch-and-release" system where numerous offenders churn in and out of
the system).
125. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011) (affirming three judge panel's order requiring California to reduce its
state prison population because the overcrowded prisons prevented the state from providing constitutionally
required medical and mental health care pursuant to the Eighth Amendment).
126. A.B. 109, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (enacted).
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California embraced drug courts quickly. 127 Oakland, California established one
of the first drug courts in the country. 128 In 1997, the state codified its "deferred
entry of judgment" program, authorizing courts to divert certain first-time drug
possessors to obtain treatment rather than go to trial. 129 In 2000, California voters
approved Proposition 36.130 This law required courts to place certain nonviolent
drug possessors on probation, rather than impose jail time. 131 It also spurred the
expansion of drug treatment programs in the state-more than 700 new programs
were initiated in the four years after the proposition's passage. 132 Under the
Proposition, qualifying defendants must complete a drug treatment program as a
condition of probation. 133 Though controversial amongst drug court advocates,
Proposition 36-combined with other legislation focused on drug treatmenthelped decrease the drug-possession prison population and slowed overall prison
population growth in the state. 134 California built upon these reforms by establishing several other types of "collaborative justice" programs-like problem-oriented
135
courts-to address increasing pressures in the state.
The Public Safety Realignment Act also comports with the drug court paradigm's focus on addressing low-level, nonviolent offenders through an effectiveness lens. In response to a federal mandate to reduce the state prison population,

127. See PORTER ETAL., supra note 59, at 12 13.
128. A number of cities quickly adopted drug treatment courts after the Miami experiment, including Oakland,
California. See Michael M. O'Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 826 & n.233 (2004).
129. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000(a) (West 2016).
130. See DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, PROPOSITION 36: IMPROVING LIVES, DELIVERING RESULTS 1 (2006), http:Ilwww.

drugpolicy.org/docUploads/Prop36March2006.pdf.
131. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1 (West 2016); see also AUBREY Fox & ROBERT V. WOLF, CTR. FOR COURT
INNOVATION, THE FUTURE OF DRUG COURTS: How STATES ARE MAINSTREAMING THE DRUG COURT MODEL 13 (2004),

http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/future of drug-courts.pdf (recognizing that Proposition 36 limits the judge's
ability to use jail as a sanction to "compel offenders to seek treatment").
132. See DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, supra note 130, at 2.
133. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1. A defendant must satisfy six requirements for eligibility of deferred entry of
judgment: (1) no prior conviction for an offense involving drugs, (2) charged offense was nonviolent, (3) no
violation relating to drugs in addition to what was charged under § 1000, (4) offender has never had probation or
parole revoked without completion, (5) defendant has not completed or been terminated from another drug
diversion program within five years of the committed offense, and (6) no prior felony conviction within five years
of the committed offense. PENAL § 1000(a).
134. See Fox & WOLF, supra note 131, at 13 (describing mixed emotions amongst drug court advocates about
Proposition 36's effect); DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, supra note 130, at 1 ("[T]he number of people incarcerated in
state prisons for drug possession fell dramatically [between December 2000 and June 30, 2005] by 32
percent after Prop. 36 was approved."); Megan N. Krebbeks, One Step at a Time: Reforming Drug Diversion
Programsin California, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 417, 426 (2010) (attributing treatment program reforms as catalyst for
reduction in prison population growth).
135. These programs include a variety of problem-oriented programs, like homeless courts, domestic violence
courts, mental health courts, peer courts, and community courts. WOLF, supra note 64, at 2. These programs vary
from traditional "drug courts" as they seek to address different underlying problems that may spur criminal
behavior.
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Governor Jerry Brown signed the Act (AB 109) into law in 2011.136 This
legislation shifted responsibility to punish and supervise non-serious, non-violent,
and non-sex offenders (with no history of serious convictions) from the state to the
county. 137 Whether those individuals are diverted to community supervision or
incarcerated in county jails depends on the individual county's approach. 138 So far,
several counties have increased incarceration in county jails. 139 Nevertheless, the
legislation emphasized community supervision as the preferred method of addressing influxes in offenders headed to counties rather than state prison. 140
In recent years, Californians have notoriously approved two propositions
designed to address the state's prison population crisis. 14 1 In 2012, California
voters approved Proposition 36, reducing the severity of the state's Three Strikes
Law. 14 2 California's Three Strikes Law, enacted in 1994, required sentencing
enhancements for repeat offenders, and was considered one of the harshest
sentencing laws in the country. 143 By 2008, a quarter of the state's prison

136. See SIMON, supra note 123, at 135 (noting that the Public Safety Realignment legislation was adopted
expressly to comply with the Brown mandate to reduce the state's prison population).
137. LISA T. QUAN ET AL., STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., REALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY: CHANGES TO
THE CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM IN CALIFORNIA POST-REALIGNMENT 8 (2014), http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/defaul
files/child-page/183091/doc/slspublic/CC%20Bulletin%20Jan%2014.pdf; Robert Greene, A Year After California's Criminal Justice System Realignment, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/02/
new s/la-ol-california-criminal-justice- system-realignment20121002.
138. Realignment simply requires that counties, rather than the state, are responsible for the non-serious,
non-violent, non-sex offenders. The legislation gives each of California's fifty-eight counties the opportunity to
choose alternatives to custody for these "realignment offenders." SUSAN TURNER ET AL., RAND CORP., PUBLIC
SAFETY REALIGNMENT IN TWELVE CALIFORNIA COUNTIES 2 (2015), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/

research-reports/RR800/RR872/RANDRR872.pdf. As Turner noted, "[o]ptions available to counties include
day reporting centers (DRCs), core-model day reporting programs for smaller counties, electronic monitoring
programs, in-custody programs residential reentry programs, and local jail credits modeled on those previously
available in state prisons." Id. at 1 2. Most counties originally pursued a variety of alterative sanctions, primarily
focusing on the expansion of drug courts and other specialized collaborative courts, as well as flash incarceration,
community service and electronic or Global Positioning System monitoring. Id. at 2 3.
139. QUAN ETAL., supra note 137.
140. Eaglin, supra note 9, at 208 n. 126.
141. See, e.g., Matt Ford, Californians Vote to Weaken Mass Incarceration, ATLANTIC (Nov. 5, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/11/california-prop-47-mass-incarceration/382372/ (discussing the
significance of Proposition 47); Jessica Eaglin, California Quietly Continues to Reduce Mass Incarceration,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/california-quietly-continuesreduce-mass-incarceration (noting that after Plata, Californians began "voting into law sentencing amendments
that would reduce mass incarceration," including Proposition 36 and Proposition 47).
142. California'sProposition36, Changes in the "Three Strikes" Law (2012), BALLOTPEDA, https://ballotpedia.
org/CaliforniaProposition_36,_Changes in the %22Three Strikes%22_Law_(2012) (last visitedMay 17, 2016);
see LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, A PRIMER: THREE STRIKES

THE IMPACT AFTER MORE THAN A DECADE 36

(2005), http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/3-strikes/3-strikes 102005.pdf.
143. Under the law, the sentence term doubled for those convicted of a second felony. For third strikers, any
felony conviction, whether for a serious or violent offense or not, resulted in a sentence of between twenty-five
years and life imprisonment if a prosecutor pursued the three strikes enhancement. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S
OFFICE, supra note 142.
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population was sentenced under the Three Strikes Law. 144 Californians initially
considered reforming the law in 2004 with Proposition 66-until a bipartisan
14
media campaign framed the reform as releasing 26,000 dangerous criminals. 5
The campaign argued that three-strikers were not the type of low-level, nonviolent
offenders deserving diversion from severe sentencing. 146 Californians enacted a
scaled down version of the three strikes reform in 2012 with Proposition 36.147
This bill limited the scope of the reform by requiring a serious and/or violent
felony offense for the third strike conviction. 148 This time, advocates framed the
reform within the strictures of the drug court paradigm, focusing on the costs of
incarcerating three-strike offenders and emphasizing that any felony-serious,
violent, or otherwise-triggers the third strike. The initial ballot measure promised
to "restore the original intent of [California's Three Strikes law], which was to lock
away violent career criminals for life, without unjustly throwing away the lives of
small-time, nonviolent offenders. 149 Advocates discussed the reform in mostly
efficiency language-three strikes cost California billions,1 5 10 5 1and reducing its
breadth would reserve resources for the most serious offenders.
Here, the success of Proposition 36 demonstrates the success of the drug court
paradigm while also illustrating an important deviation as well. The proposition
15 2
severely restricts the number of prisoners eligible to benefit from the reform.

144. By December 2010, 40,998 were behind bars in California for second or third strike offenses. CALIF.
DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, SECOND AND THIRD STRIKERS FELONS IN THE ADULT INSTITUTIONAL

POPULATION (2011), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/reports-research/offender-information-services-branch/Quarterly/
Strike l/STRIKE1d 103.pdf.
145. Until two weeks before the election, sixty-two percent of voters supported amending the law. Alexa
Vaughn, Debating the Cost of a Three-Strikes Sentence, NEwS21, http://berkeley.news21.com/behindbars/deathin-prison/three-strikes (last visited Mar. 9, 2016). The media campaign launched in the final weeks led to a decline
in support. Id. The proposition ultimately failed. Id.
146. See, e.g., Edward J. Erler & Brian P. Janiskee, Three-Strikes Law Hits Its Target, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28,
2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/sep/28/opinion/oe-erler28 ("It is difficult to see the injustice of [25-to-life
sentences] for career criminals who have been given multiple chances to reform," even if the third offense is
stolen vitamins or videotapes). Proposition 66 would have required a serious or violent felony as opposed to any
felony to trigger the third-strike. Id. In addition, it would have reduced the number of crimes that qualified as
"serious" or "violent," thus limiting the reach of the statute. Id. A contentious debate surrounded the proposed
bill's exclusion of residential burglary from the list of "strikeable" offenses. See id.
147. See J. RICHARD COUZENS & TRICIA A. BIGELOW, THE AMENDMENT OF THE THREE STRIKES SENTENCING
LAW 5, 98 (2016), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Three-Strikes-Amendment-Couzens-Bigelow.pdf
(including full text of Proposition 36, and describing its effect).
148. Id.
149. See Kelly Duane de la Vega & Katie Galloway, Three Strikes of Injustice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/09/opinion/three-strikes-of-injustice.html.
150. Vaughn, supra note 145 (estimating that three strikes adds over $19 billion to the prison budget). Justice
Advocacy Project, STAN L. SCH., https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-justice-advocacy-project/ (Last visited Mar. 5,
2016) (same).
151. Vaughn, supra note 145.
152. The new law requires that the new felony committed be serious or violent, see CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 667(d)-(e) (West 2016), but it also permits designated offenders already serving three-strikes sentences to
petition the court for resentencing. These offenders must demonstrate that their third offense was non-serious,
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Only certain defendants whose third-strike offense is non-serious and nonviolent
are precluded from exposure to the three strikes law. 15 3 In addition the proposition
contains provisions that remove judicial discretion to sentence strike offenders to
concurrent rather than consecutive terms of incarceration. 154 As a result, only a
small subset of the 42,000 prisoners already sentenced under California's strikes
law qualifies for resentencing. 155 Even where prisoners are eligible for resentencing, judges may prevent certain offenders from the benefits of the proposition
based on public safety concerns. 15 6 Consistent with the paradigm, Proposition 36
157
supporters justified its passage based upon its anticipated cost-saving effect.
Reports since its passage continue to emphasize this point.158 The Proposition
deviates on one key point-the reform applies to people who are, by definition,
repeat offenders. Nevertheless, the zeroed in focus on providing alternatives for

non-violent and they would have qualified for a second offense sentencing in the first instance. See COUZENS &
BIGELOW, supra note 147, at 5 8, http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Three-Strikes-Amendment-CouzensBigelow.pdf (including full text of Proposition 36, and describing its effect).
153. Even where the new felony is not serious or violent, defendants will still be sentenced to 25-years-to-life
as a third strike offender in two instances. First, where the current felony of conviction is a serious drug offense
(drug trafficking in excessive amounts or drug possession of crack cocaine or heroin), sex offense, violent offense
(offenses committed with a firearm), or if the offender is convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 667(e). Second, defendants previously convicted of sexually violent offenses; child abuse offenses;
homicide offenses; or serious or violent offenses punishable in California by life imprisonment or death, do not
qualify for the benefits of Proposition 36. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d).
154. California's Three Strikes law includes two components: second and third strike sentence enhancements.
"Second strike" offenders refer to those offenders that had one previous serious or violent felony conviction then
sentenced for a new felony conviction (not just serious or violent). See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, supra note
142, at 5. Second-strike offenders will receive twice the term otherwise required by law for the new conviction. Id.
In contrast, third strike offenders had two or more previous serious or violent convictions at the time of
sentencing. Id. at 6. There, any new serious or violent felony convictions will result in a twenty-five years to life
sentence. Id. The tension referenced in the text concerns the Three Strikes law requirement to sentence
strike offenders to consecutive rather than concurrent terms of imprisonment for multiple offenses. Id. at 6 7. The
California courts have been creative in avoiding this provision, requiring that consecutive sentences should
be imposed only when not committed on the same occasion or out of the same set of operative facts. See People v.
Hendrix, 16 Cal. 4th 508, 513 (1997). The new amendments introduced by Proposition 36 prevent such
interpretations. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(a)(7)-(8) (West 2016); COUZENS & BIGELOW, supra note 147, at
28 31 (discussing tension between § 1170.12(a) and § 667(c)).
155. See Proposition 36, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE (July 18, 2012), http://www.lao.ca.gov/balloU2012/
36 11 2012.aspx (estimating that, as of March 2012, 33,000 inmates were second strikers and 9000 inmates were
third strikers). Some are excluded because they are ineligible, others are excluded because the new rules on
concurrent versus consecutive sentencing would expose them to longer sentences now than they already received.
Id.
156. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.126(f) (West 2016) (permitting the court to reject requests for resentencing
if it would pose an "unreasonable risk of danger to public safety").
157. In the ballot initiative supporting Proposition 36, the sponsors stated that "[p]recious financial and law
enforcement resources should not be improperly diverted to impose life sentences for some non-violent offenses.
Prop. 36 will help stop clogging overcrowded prisons with non-violent offenders, so we have room to keep violent
felons off the streets." COUZENS & BIGELOW, supra note 147, at 9.
158. See, e.g., THREE STRIKES PROJECT, STANFORD LAW SCH., PROGRESS REPORT:

THREE STRIKES REFORM

(PROPOSITION 36) 2 3 (2014), https://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/child-page/441702/doc/slspublic/
Three%20Strikes%2OReform%2OReport.pdf.
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the most sympathetic third strikers resonates with the characteristics of the drug
court paradigm.
The most recent California reform-Proposition 47159-goes further in exposing a break between rhetorical adherence to the drug court paradigm and scope of
implementation. This Proposition, which California voters approved by a majority
vote in November 2014, reclassifies several low-level, nonviolent offenses as
misdemeanors rather than wobblers. 160 "Wobblers" are offenses that can be
charged as misdemeanors or felonies dependent upon the discretion of the county
prosecutor. This distinction is significant, as felonies can result in longer sentences
and more severe collateral sanctions. Misdemeanors are limited to sentences less
than a year. Proposition 47 does impose eligibility requirements, but these
restrictions are not as narrowly defined as other California reforms. State prosecutors must charge the reclassified offenses as misdemeanors unless the defendant
has a prior conviction for certain, enumerated serious offenses. 16 1 Proposition
supporters assert that the reform will save California millions of dollars. Anticipated state savings from the reform are earmarked for crime-prevention programs,
including substance abuse services, truancy and dropout prevention and victim
services. 162 Implementation of this reform is attributed with further reducing the
163
state's prison and jail populations.
California's criminal justice reforms provide valuable insight into the drug court
paradigm. For the most part, state and voter-created reforms adhere-at least
rhetorically-to the paradigmatic focus on low-level, nonviolent offenders, cost,
and-to a lesser extent-recidivism reduction to justify their passage. At the same
time, state created reforms more strictly adhere to the paradigm's narrow focus.

159. Proposition 47 was sponsored by private individuals and nonprofit organizations, including the Open
Society Foundation, the ACLU, and the Atlantic Advocacy Fund. See Paige St. John, New York Foundations
Bankrolled Proposition47, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-ff-new-yorkfoundations-bankrolled-prop-47-20150202-story.html.
160. These offenses include theft less than $950 (including shoplifting, forgery, insufficient funds, petty theft,
receipt of stolen property, and petty theft with a prior) and drug possession. See FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
3 5 (2015), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Prop47FAQs.pdf (summarizing changes under Proposition 47).
Voters approved the bill with 59.61% percent of the vote. CaliforniaProposition47, Reduced Penaltiesfor Some
Crimes Initiative (2014), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/California Proposition_47,_Reduced Penalties
forSomeCrimesInitiative %282014-cite note-laws-I (last visited Mar. 9, 2016).
161. These include murder, rape, and certain gun or sex offenses. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(c)(iv)
(West 2016).
162. The California Legislative Analyst's Office estimates annual savings may range from $100 million to
$200 million. MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST OFFICE, IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSITION 47, 3-4 (2015),

http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2015/budget/prop47/implementation-prop47-021715.pdf. Sixty-five percent of the
savings are directed towards mental health and substance use treatment services; twenty-five percent are allocated
towards truancy and dropout prevention; and ten percent of the savings are allocated to the Victim Compensation
and Government Claims Board. Id. at 4.
163. See Cindy Chang et al., Unintended Consequences ofProposition47 Pose Challengefor CriminalJustice
System, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-prop47-anniversary-20151106story.html (noting that since voters approved Proposition 47, the state's prison population is down 3.8% and
statewide jail population down 11.7%).
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Legislation like Public Safety Realignment shifts responsibility for low-level
offenders, but it does little to require shifts in how those offenders are punished in
the system. Voter-initiated reforms like Proposition 36 and 47 have the potential to
reach much further, as they restructure sentencing laws to reduce sentences
directly. Though eligibility requirements remain, these voter-initiated reforms
provide insight to potential shifts in advocacy tactics discussed in Section IV
below.
C. The Federal Government

Reforms introduced at the federal level to address mass incarceration tend to
adhere to the drug court paradigm as well. When considering federal reforms, one
must consider both what the federal government pushes at the state level and what
reforms it adopts to apply to the federal system. The federal government funds the
JRI, discussed above. 164 Moreover, Congress supported drug court development in
the states since 1994 through federal funding. 165 In 2002, President Bush included
$50 million in the budget to support local drug courts and the National Drug Court
Institute. 166 Congress continued to support the development, implementation, and
167
expansion of drug courts through the Drug Court Discretionary Grant Program.
To the extent that drug courts created a frame to address mass incarceration, the
federal government contributed to that development.
The federal system, however, is the largest incarcerator in the country, and the
efforts to address mass incarceration at the federal level demonstrate the prevalence of the drug court paradigm. 168 Between 2014 and 2015, two very different
sets of bipartisan bills were introduced to reform aspects of the federal justice

164. See THE WHITE HOUSE, THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 121 (2014),

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defaultfiles/omb/budgetlfy20l4/assets/justice.pdf (describing federal funding).
165. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (allocating federal money for drug courts and
establishing the Drug Court Program Office).
166. The Honorable Deborah J. Daniels, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Justice Programs, Remarks at the
National Association of Drug Court Professionals' 4th Annual Juvenile and Family Drug Court Training
Conference (Jan. 9, 2003) (transcript available at http://ojp.gov/archives/speeches/2003/nadcpconference.htm).
167. Compare Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524 (allocating $40 million for
the drug court discretionary fund in fiscal year 2009), with Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, Pub. L. 103-322. See Peggy Fulton Hora & Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Courts in the Twenty-First
Century: The Evolution of the Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 GA. L. REV. 717, 765 n.322 (2008)
(internal citations omitted) (highlighting increase in fiscal budget from $10 million to $40 million between 2008
and 2009).
168. Though the federal prison population declined in 2014, it has nonetheless grown by almost 800% since
1980. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42987, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION BUILDUP: OVERVIEW,
POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS 51 (2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf; CARSON, supra note 2.
The Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), like the prison systems in many states, suffers from systemic prison
overcrowding. JAMES, supra note 168, at 19. While the BOP does not experience budget constraints like the states,
sequestration brought a newfound awareness to the BOP's growing portion of the Department of Justice's overall
budget. See Eaglin, supra note 9, at 191 n.4.
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system. First, bills were introduced that would reduce the severity of mandatory
minimum penalties. 169 For example, the Smarter Sentencing Act (SSA), sponsored
by Senators Dick Durbin and Mike Lee, would reduce mandatory minimum
170
sentences for drug offenders and modestly expand the statutory safety valve.
The bill also renders the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA)-which reduced the
disparity between drug weights in crack versus powder cocaine offenses triggering
mandatory sentences-retroactive. 17 1 DOJ estimated in July172
2014 that SSA would
spending.
averted
from
savings
fiscal
in
billion
$7.4
provide
The second set of bills introduced to Congress focus on increasing access to
EBPPs that would reduce recidivism. 17 3 In February 2015, Senators John Cornyn
and Sheldon Whitehouse introduced the Corrections, Oversight, Recidivism
Reduction, and Eliminating Costs for Taxpayers in Our National System
(CORRECTIONS) Act. 174 This bill directs the Federal Bureau of Prisons to assess
each federal prisoner's risk of recidivism and risk of violence regularly. 175 That
information would be used to calculate the number of earned credit days to reduce
a prisoner's sentence through participation in rehabilitative programming-lowrisk offenders can earn ten days of credit per month, while medium risk offenders

169. See Justice Safety Valve Act of 2015, S. 353, 114th Cong.; Smarter Sentencing Act of 2015, S. 502, 114th
Cong.; Smarter Sentencing Act of 2014, S. 1410, 113th Cong. (2014); Justice Safety Valve Act of 2013, S. 619,
113th Cong. (2013). Though not discussed in the text in detail, the Justice Safety Valve Act would provide judges
with discretion to relieve any offenders from mandatory minimum penalties if they fall outside the scope of
offenders originally targeted by Congress. None of these bills made it out of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
170. Smarter Sentencing Act of 2015, S. 502, 114th Cong. (2015). The "safety valve" refers to legislatively
recognized exceptions to application of mandatory minimum penalties. First time, nonviolent drug offenders with
one criminal history point currently qualify for release from mandatory minimum penalties. See 18 U.S.C. 3553 (f)
(2016).
171. The drug weight triggering mandatory minimum penalties differs depending on the type of controlled
substance at issue. Though crack and powder cocaine are the same chemical substance in different forms,
punishment for possession and trafficking in the two drugs differs greatly. Prior to the Fair Sentencing Act of
2010, five grams of crack cocaine triggered a statutorily mandated five-year sentence, as compared to 500 grams
of powder cocaine. This disparity is referred to as the 100:1 ratio. The Fair Sentencing Act increased the weight
triggering mandatory minimum penalties for crack cocaine offenses, thus reducing the disparity between the two
drug weights treatment from 100:1 to 18:1. See The Fair Sentencing Act, S. 1789, llth Cong. (2010). The
Smarter Sentencing Act would make the new drug weights retroactive, thus permitting some prisoners sentenced
under the old law to petition for a reduced sentence. See Smarter Sentencing Act, S. 502.
172. Jane Hamsher, FDL Exclusive: DOJ Says Smarter Sentencing Act Would Save Taxpayers $24 Billion,
FDL MAIN BLOG (July 25, 2014), http://news.firedoglake.com/2014/07/25/fdl-exclusive-doj-says-smartersentencing-act-would-save-taxpayers-24-billion. More than 8,000 prisoners sentenced in the federal system could
seek sentence reductions under the bill. Id.
173. See CORRECTIONS Act, S. 467, 114th Cong. § 2(b)(2)(B)(i) (2015) (requiring programming certification as "evidence-based and effective at reducing or mitigating offender risk and recidivism"). This section
focuses on the CORRECTIONS Act, which generates from two bills previously introduced into Congress with the
same focus and goals. Recidivism Reduction and Public Safety Act, S. 1675, 113th Cong. (2013); Public Safety
Enhancement Act, H.R. 2656, 113th Cong. (2013).
174. S.467.
175. See S. 467, § 3(a) (requiring creation of the "Post-Sentencing Risk and Needs Assessment System" to
"assess and determine the recidivism risk level of all prisoners and classify each prisoner as having a low,
moderate, or high risk of recidivism").
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can earn five days per month. 176 Sex offenders, terrorism offenders, violent
offenders, repeat offenders, major organized crime offenders, and major fraud
offenders would be prohibited from earning credits under the program. 177 The bill
also introduces a supervised release pilot program to reduce recidivism and
improve recovery from drug abuse. 178
The first set of bills center on decreasing sentence severity for certain qualifying, low-level, nonviolent drug offenders, while the second seek to increase
treatment opportunities based upon evidence of effectiveness at reducing recidivism. Supporters of the sentencing bill and the recidivism reduction bill argue over
their respective merits through a cost-savings lens. Both sets of bills fit within the
drug court paradigm, even if they seek to build on different aspects. Each has
detailed eligibility criteria and each focuses on evidence of efficiency and
effectiveness. Additionally, both bills focus reforms on drug offenders.
Though the Senate Judiciary Committee did not approve the previously discussed bills, it did approve a new, comprehensive bill to improve the federal justice
system in November 2015. The Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act combines
aspects of the earlier, competing bills. It reduces mandatory sentences for certain
drug offenses, expands the drug safety valve, and makes the Fair Sentencing Act
retroactive. 179 It also incentivizes prisoners to complete treatment programs to
reduce their risk of recidivism through good time credits that would lead to
alternative supervision circumstances. 180 This measure uses risk assessment
tools-an EBPP-to allocate federal correctional resources.18 1 As with predecessor recidivism reduction bills, the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act would
limit earned time credits to eligible inmates, again providing the most incentive to
low risk inmates. 18 2 It also creates mandatory minimum penalties for domestic
violence resulting in death and providing weapons to terrorists. 183 This bill fits
within the paradigm, as it uses exclusionary qualification criteria to apply its
benefits to certain low-level, nonviolent offenders. It emphasizes EBPPs and cost

176. S. 467 § 2(6)(A)(i) (unspecified risk-level prisoners receive five days of time credit per thirty days while
low risk prisoners receive an additional five days of time credit in the same period). Interestingly, the bill would
not reduce the sentencing restriction that requires all federal prisoners to serve eighty-five percent of their
sentences. Id. As such, the credits earned would be limited by the overall cap at fifteen percent of a sentence.
177. S. 467 § 2(6)(A)(iii); Sens Whitehouse, Cornyn Introduce Prison Reform Legislation, WHITEHOUSE.GOV
(Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/release/sens-whitehouse-cornyn-introduce-prison-reformlegislation.
178. S. 467 § 7(c).
179. Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, S. 2123, 114th Cong. § 101 (reducing mandatory
minimums for prior drug felons); § 102 (broadening the existing safety valve to include offenders with up to four
criminal history points); § 106 (rendering Fair Sentencing Act retroactive).
180. S. 2123 § 202 (requiring the creation of statistically validated recidivism reduction programming and
incentivizing completion of programs through earned time credits).
181. See id.; S. 2123 § 203 (requiring the Attorney General to develop a risk and needs assessment system to
classify inmates as high, moderate, or low risk of recidivism).
182. See S. 2123 § 202.
183. See S. 2123 §§ 107 08.
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18 4
effectiveness to justify its passage.
The U.S. Department of Justice's "Smart on Crime" Initiative implemented and
supported several reforms that adhere to the drug court paradigm. Announced in
August 2013, this initiative calls on federal prosecutors to avoid seeking mandatory minimum sentences for lower level nonviolent drug offenders.18 5 The basis of
this reform lies at the intersection of a 2012 Supreme Court decision and
prosecutorial discretion. In Alleyne v. United States, the Supreme Court declared
that a jury must find the weight of drugs that trigger the mandatory minimum
penalty beyond a reasonable doubt.18 6 Practically, this means that prosecutors
must specify the weight of drugs in their plea deals, and if they do not, then the
mandatory minimum penalty cannot be triggered. 18 7 As part of the Smart on Crime
initiative, former Attorney General Eric Holder issued revised charging memoranda demanding each district refrain from using mandatory minimum penalties,
even as bargaining chips for low-level, nonviolent drug offenders.1 8 8 This initiative
was justified through an effectiveness frame. As the internal report explained, the
system of mass incarceration "is disruptive to families, expensive to the taxpayer,
and may not serve the goal of reducing recidivism. We must marshal resources,
and use evidence-based strategies, to curb the disturbing rates of recidivism by
those reentering our communities." ' 9 Consistent with the drug court paradigm,
the need for more effective policies drives the shift in approach.
As part of that initiative, the U.S. Department of Justice supported a significant
amendment to the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Federal Sentencing Guidelines
in 2014.190 In April 2013, the Sentencing Commission proposed a new amendment

184. The bill incorporates the CORRECTIONS Act, which stands for the Corrections Oversight, Recidivism
Reduction, and Eliminating Costs for Taxpayers in Our National System Act, of 2015. The bill's incorporation of
evidence-based programming and risk management are designed to reduce recidivism and reduce costs in the
prison system. See also Carl Hulse & Jennifer Steinhauer, Sentencing Overhaul Proposed in Senate with
Bipartisan Backing, N.Y. Times (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/us/politics/senate-plan-toease-sentencing-laws.html (noting that bill supporters "hope it will reduce the financial and societal costs of mass
incarceration").
185. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 2-4 (2013), http://www.justice.gov/ag/smart-on-crime.pdf (discussing alternatives to incarceration for
low-level, non-violent crimes).
186. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2163464 (2013).
187. See generally Memorandum from Eric J. Holder, Attorney Gen., to U.S. Attorneys, Dep't Policy on
Charging Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Recidivist Enhancements in Certain Drug Cases (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/defauldfiles/ag/legacy/2014/04/1 1/ag-memo-drug-guidance.pdf (discussing recent case
law and department policy in certain drug cases).
188. Id. at 1 ("[W]e now refine our charging policy regarding mandatory minimums for certain nonviolent,
low-level drug offenders.").
189. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 1.
190. The Commission, as an independent federal agency located within the Judiciary, sets an advisory set of
guidelines for judges to follow at sentencing. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N 2013) [hereinafter USSGI (providing guidelines for judges); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (West
2016) (explaining application of guidelines in imposing a sentence); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
234 35 (2005) (holding mandatory adherence to the guidelines unconstitutional).
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referred to as "drugs-minus-two," which would modestly reduce sentences for
seventy percent of federal drug offenders.191 Designed after Amendment 706,192
the proposed amendment would reduce federal sentencing guideline section
2D1.1's base offense level by two levels for all drug trafficking offenders. 193 The
Sentencing Commission estimates that this amendment, applied prospectively,
would reduce sentences by an average of eleven months, or seventeen percent, for
offenders affected by the change. 194 This reform would reduce the federal prison
population by 6,550 prisoners over the course of five
years. 195 The U.S. Depart196
amendment.
this
supported
actively
ment of Justice
Interestingly, the Sentencing Commission diverged from the Justice Department's view on retroactivity in ways that demonstrate a break from the drug court
paradigm. The Commission faced the internal decision whether to apply the
drugs-minus-two amendment retroactively, which could apply to as many as
51,000 prisoners' sentences. 197 The Justice Department proposed limitations to
retroactive application of the amendment so that it applied to only "lower level,
' 198
nonviolent drug [trafficking] offenders without significant criminal histories."
Specifically, it proposed carve-outs for individuals with Category III or above
criminal history scores, individuals with sentences increased for possession or use
of a weapon, or for those offenders who obstructed justice, played an aggravating
role, or used threat of violence in the commission of the offense. 199 Consistent with
the drug court paradigm, these reforms introduced qualification criteria that
limited the reform's benefits to primarily low-level, nonviolent drug offenders.
The Sentencing Commission rejected this limitation, though, making the amendment retroactive and leading to the October 2015 release of nearly six thousand

191. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 79 Fed. Reg. 3280-01 (Jan. 27, 2014).
192. USSG, App. C, Amendment 706 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2007) (reducing base offense level for crack
offenders by two levels for guideline calculation).
193. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 79 Fed. Reg. 3280-01 (Jan. 17, 2014). "Levels" refers to
the guidelines' base offense number used to calculate the recommended guideline sentence range. See USSG § 5A
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2007).

194. Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n Votes to Reduce Drug Trafficking
Sentences 1 (April 10, 2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/defaullfiles/pdf/news/press-releases-and-news-advisories/
press-releases/20140410 Press Release.pdf.
195. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Attorney Gen. Holder Urges Changes in Fed. Sentencing Guidelines to
Reserve Harshest Penalties for Most Serious Drug Traffickers (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2014/March/14-ag-263.html.
196. Id.
197. Memorandum from the Office of Research and Data and Office of Gen. Counsel to U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n, Analysis of the Impact of the 2014 Drug Guidelines Amendment If Made Retroactive 7 (May 27,
2014),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/retroactivity-analyses/drugguidelines-amendment/20140527_DrugRetroAnalysis.pdf.
198. Retroactive Application of the Pending Drug Guideline Amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 4 (2014) (statement of Sally Quillian Yates, U.S. Attorney,
Northern District of Georgia), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearingsand-meetings/20140610/Testimony_DOJ.pdf.
199. Id. at7 8.
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prisoners. 20 0 Full retroactive application of the drugs-minus-two amendment is
expected to alleviate federal prison overcrowding in the coming years.20 1
Recent reforms adopted or introduced in the federal system illustrate consistency with the drug court paradigm's central tenets. From legislative bills to
executive policies to sentencing guideline revisions, the reforms both rhetorically
and substantively focus on low-level, nonviolent offenders through an effectiveness lens. Though the Commission's eligibility requirements were much broader
than other reforms introduced-a matter discussed further below-the clear thrust
of federal reforms suggests that a small subset of the current prison population
would be better served through different criminal justice interventions other than
simply incarceration. The acceptance of this frame in the federal context mirrors
the image projected in the states as well. Though beneficial to setting the stage for
addressing flaws in the criminal justice system, Section III illustrates limitations
within this particular frame of reform.

III.

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE DRUG COURT PARADIGM

The drug court paradigm organizes the social and political response to certain
offenders in the face of economic and political pressure to manage prison
populations. This frame has created space for the sentencing reforms discussed
above. These reforms-specifically aimed to address low-level, nonviolent offenders through cost-effective, evidence-based alternatives to incarcerationcontribute to recent declines in the U.S. prison population.20 2
And yet, this frame suffers from shortcomings. That frame prefers treatment and
supervision in lieu of other solutions. Though the frame captures some reforms
that are necessary and beneficial, it stands to damage the criminal justice system in
the long term by obscuring other, necessary interventions to reduce incarceration.
The primary concern is that the drug court paradigm occupies the criminal justice
reform "field"-in the face of mass incarceration, the single approach to reducing
mass incarceration captured by drug courts is being replicated.
This Section exposes three limitations to the drug court paradigm. Part A
discusses how the drug court paradigm pushes reforms that exclude the types of
prisoners currently maintaining large incarcerated populations. Part B demonstrates how the drug court paradigm facilitates reforms that exacerbate sentence

200. The Commission chose to delay release of any offenders until November 2015 from retroactive reduction
pursuant to the guideline amendment. Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, U.S. Sentencing Commission
Unanimously Votes to Allow Delayed Retroactive Reduction in Drug Trafficking Sentences (July 18, 2014),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-news-advisories/press-releases/201407 18press release.pdf. The delayed release date resulted in a surge of prisoners eligible for release on the first date of
application. Sari Horwitz, Justice Department Set to Free 6,000 Prisoners,Largest One-Time Release, WASH.
POST (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-department-about-to-free6000-prisoners-largest-one-time-release/2015/10/06/961f4c9a-6ba2- 1 1e5-aa5b-f78a98956699_story.html.
201. See Horwitz, supra note 200.
202. CARSON, supra note 2, at 1 2.
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lengths for some offenders, a causal factor driving prison population growth. Part
C explains how this paradigm obscures normative concerns about the expansion of
the justice systems' reach.
A. The NarrowedFrame

The drug court paradigm narrows the "problem" of mass incarceration to a very
specific, small category of offenders. The majority of reforms implemented within
this frame shorten prison stays only for low-level, nonviolent offenders either
through diversionary programs, statutory amendments, or discretionary policy
prioritization. The narrow frame results in reforms that either sidestep the large
offender populations or it disqualifies so many people from the benefits of the
reform that it negates the potential effect of the reform.
Despite the paradigm's framing to the contrary, very few inmates in prison
constitute "low-level drug offenders." The Bureau of Justice Statistics calculates
that approximately sixteen percent of state prisoners are drug offenders.20 3
However, a 2004 study estimated that only six percent of state inmates and less
than two percent of federal inmates qualify as "unambiguously low-level" drug
offenders.20 4 According to one survey, four out of five state inmates serving time
for a "nonviolent" offense meet criteria that qualify them as a "serious" offender.205 The "serious" offender criteria in the survey includes an offender who
carried or used a weapon in the current offense, had a prior violent conviction,
committed the current offense while under correctional control, or had two or more
prior sentences.20 6 These offenders do not fit into the paradigmatic definition of
low-level, nonviolent offenders implemented in most sentencing reforms.20 7
Examples abound where reforms reach only a narrow sliver of the offender
population. For example, California recently adopted Proposition 36 to reduce the
severity of its three strikes legislation.20 8 In total, this reform is estimated to affect
between a few hundred to just 2000 of the more than 42,000 inmates serving
sentences under the Three Strikes Law.20 9 In the federal system, a "Smart on
Crime" oriented Justice Department advocated for a restricted retroactive applica-

203. Id. at 16.
204. Eric L. Sevigny & Jonathan P. Caulkins, Kingpins orMules: An Analysis of Drug Offenders Incarcerated
in Federal and State Prisons, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. PoL'Y 401,418 (2004).
205. BERT USEEM & ANNE MORRISON PIEHL, PRISON STATE: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS INCARCERATION 60-61

(2008).
206. Id.
207. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12, at 168 169.
208. See supra Part II.B.
209. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12, at 184. This is largely because the reform does not impact second
strikers who make up the vast majority of inmates convicted under the three strikes law. Proposition 36, supra
note 155 (estimating that, as of March 2012, 33,000 inmates were second strikers and 9,000 inmates were third
strikers).
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tion of the Sentencing Commission's modest guideline amendment.2 10 While the
amendment would apply to all offenders sentenced under section 2D 1.1, the U.S.
Department of Justice asked the Sentencing Commission to narrow retroactive
application of the amendment to include only a small category of low-level,
nonviolent drug offenders. 2 1 1 As Sally Yates, then-U.S. Attorney for the Northern
District of Georgia explained, this caveat would ensure that retroactivity would
"apply only to the category of drug offender who warrants a less severe sentence
and who also poses the least risk of reoffending. ' '2 12 Of the 51,000 offenders
estimated to have sentences affected by retroactive application of the guidelines
amendment, more than half would have been excluded based on the Justice
Department's proposed carve-outs.2 13

Reforms focus almost exclusively on low-level, nonviolent drug offenders
because the paradigm frames this narrow subpopulation as the driver of mass
incarceration. From the federal system to the states, policymakers are zeroing their
focus on drug offenders in particular.2 14 In reality, the driver of state and federal
incarceration has shifted. Frank Zimring proposes that prison population growth
fits into distinct phases of expansion. From 1985 to 1992, increased prosecution of
drug offenders, and the subsequent increased length of stay for those offenders,
increased prison populations across the country.2 15 But during the mid-1990s, the
driver of incarcerated populations shifted back to the general population of
offenders, not drug offenders. Marie Gottschalk notes, for example, that from 1994
to 2006, defendants convicted of violent crimes accounted for almost two thirds of

210. See supra Part II.C.
211. See supra notes 201 05 and accompanying text.
212. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Dep't Urges U.S. Sentencing Comm'n to Make Certain
Individuals Incarcerated for Drug Offenses Retroactively Eligible for Reduced Sentences (June 10, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-urges-us- sentencing- commission-make-certain-individualsincarcerated-drug.
213. See Memorandum from the Office of Research and Data and Office of Gen. Counsel to U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n, supra note 197, at 13 14. According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission's impact analysis, nearly
24,000 defendants would be excluded based upon their criminal history category. See id. at 13. Nearly 15,700
defendants would be excluded due to enhancements for possession or use of a weapon. Id. Nearly 2,500
defendants would be excluded because their sentence lengths were lengthened for obstruction of justice
adjustments. Id. And nearly 8,000 would be excluded based upon an aggravating role in the offense. Id.
214. Compare Obama, supra note 81 ("But here's the thing: Over the last few decades, we've also locked up
more and more nonviolent drug offenders than ever before, for longer.., than ever before. And that is the real
reason our prison population is so high."), with John Pfaff, For True Penal Reform, Focus on the Violent
Offenders, WASH. POST (July 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/for-true-penal-reform-focuson-the-violent-offenders/2015/07/26/1340ad4c-3208-1 le5-97ae-30a30cca95d7_story.html ("This claim [that nonviolent drug offenders drive mass incarceration] is simply wrong ....And contrary to Obama's claim, drug
inmates tend to serve relatively short sentences. It is the inmates who are convicted of violent crimes who serve
the longer terms.").
215. Franklin E. Zimring, Imprisonment Rates and the New Politics of CriminalPunishment, 3 PUNISHMENT &
SoCy 161, 162 (2001).
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the overall growth in state prisoners.2 16 By the 2000s, scholars recognized that
drug crimes alone could not explain continued prison population growth.

17

As

Marie Gottschalk explains, because "the contribution of violent offenders to the
prison population now significantly dwarfs the contribution of drug offenders,"
ending the war on drugs "will not necessarily end mass incarceration., 2 18 Even if
the goals of the drug court paradigm are achieved-namely that low-level,
nonviolent drug offenders were treated more effectively through diversion programs-the U.S. prison population would still be far out of proportion to other
countries.2 19 It would also remain out of proportion to the average
prison size
220
maintained in the United States for the majority of the 20th century.
B. The Obscured Sentence Length Problem

The drug court paradigm also obscures an underlying issue that drives prison
population growth today: increased sentence length. Treatment-oriented reforms
can obscure the need for sentence length reductions. Worse still, the paradigm can
facilitate reforms that can exacerbate sentence length further while removing the
political will to address mass incarceration generally.
Increased sentence length drives today's prison population growth. Starting in
the 1980s, the length of sentences increased for offenders across the board.22 1
Partially, this was a result of the War on Drugs and harsher drug sentences.2 22 But
223
the increase in sentence length applied to property and violent offenders also.
Between 1991 and 2003, the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions that
eliminated the Eighth Amendment's check on non-death penalty sentence
disproportionality analysis.2 24 At the same time, the passage of recidivist
216. See Marie Gottschalk, No Way Out? Life Sentences and the Politics of PenalReform, in LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE: AMERICA'S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 227, 237 (Charles J. Ogletree & Austin Sarat eds., 2012) (internal
citations omitted).
217. See TRAVIS ETAL., supra note 8, at 54-55 (2014) (defining the period from 2000 2010 as one of negligible
growth in the prison system, and attributing prison population increases to imprisonments per arrest across all
crime types, particularly non-drug crimes); CLEAR & FROST, supra note 39, at 31 34 (while the War on Drug
explains early phases of prison expansion, later growth has more to do with increased length of stay for the
general offender population).
218. Gottschalk, supra note 216, at 167.
219. See CARSON, supra note 2, at 137; NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES 137 (2008).

220. See Jessica M. Eaglin, Improving Economic Sanctions in the States, 99 MINN. L. REv. 1837, 1843 (2015)
(showing that "the current rate of incarceration remains far outsized in comparison to the average pre- 1980s rate,
and to the rates of other countries with similar political and economic structures").
221. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, TIME SERVED: THE HIGH COST, Low RETURN OF LONGER PRISON TERMS 2 (2012)

("[O]ffenders released in 2009 served an average of almost three
longer than offenders released in 1990.").
222. See supra notes 25 31.
223. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 221, at 3.
224. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003) (holding
clubs under California's three strikes law was not unconstitutionally
77 (2003) (holding that a life sentence for stealing four video

years in custody, nine months or 36 percent

that a life sentence for shoplifting three golf
excessive); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,
tapes under habitual offender law was not

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:595

statutes 225 and extended sentence ranges ratcheted up sentence length for a broad
range of offenses. Between 1990 and 2009, the length of sentence for drug
offenders increased by thirty-six percent; 226 the length of sentence for violent
offenders increased by thirty-seven percent; 227 the length of sentence for property
crimes increased by twenty-four percent.2 28 Moreover, the United States is
witnessing a massive increase in prisoners serving life or de facto life sentences.
229
Today, more than 140,000 people are serving some form of life imprisonment.
One in every nine prisoners is serving a life sentence.2 30 Since 2008, life sentences
increased by almost twelve percent and Life Without Parole ("LWOP") sentences
231
ls
increased by twenty-two percent.
In the last two decades, the use of LWOP
sentences has increased by 300% .232 Moreover, with the abolition of discretionary
parole systems in sixteen states and the federal system, a large proportion of those
sentenced to life are ineligible for release. 2 33 "De facto" life sentences, or
sentences where inmates serve long sentences or consecutive sentences that outlast
the person's natural life expectancy, are also on the rise.234
Reforms adopted within the drug court paradigm rarely focus on reducing
sentence length directly. Because the paradigm frames the mass incarceration
problem as an issue of more effectively addressing offenders through treatment and
supervision, reforms focus on providing evidence of recidivism reductions. Reductions in incarceration are framed as cost-effective by-products of treating offenders
differently. For example, JRI explicitly focuses on decreasing parole and probation
revocation reforms and creating treatment-focused diversionary programs.2 35
These efforts depress the numbers of offenders reentering prison, but the reforms
do little to shorten sentences for the majority of offenders who are incarcerated.
This leads to short-term decreases in prison populations and long-term growth as

unconstitutionally excessive); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (holding that sentencing a first
time drug offender to mandatory life sentence for possession of 672 grams of cocaine was not unconstitutionally
excessive under the Eighth Amendment).
225. These include, for example, California's Three Strikes Law. See supra notes 143-45.
226. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 221, at 3.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. ASHELY NELLIS & RYAN KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, No EXIT: THE EXPANDING USE OF LIFE
SENTENCES IN AMERICA 3 (2009).

230. Id.
231. ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON: THE HISTORIC RISE IN LIFE SENTENCES IN

AMERICA 13 (2013), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/incLife%20Goes%200n%202013.pdf.
232. Ashley Nellis, Tinkering with Life: A Look at the Inappropriateness of Life Without Parole as an
Alternative to the Death Penalty, 67 U. Miami L. Rev. 439, 441-42 (2013).
233. Id.
234. See Jessica S. Henry, Death-in-PrisonSentences: Overutilized and Underscrutinized, in LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE: AMERICA'S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 66, 70 71 (Charles J. Ogeltree & Austin Sarat, eds., 2012); see also
Bunch v. Smith, 685 E3d 546, 553 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding fixed term sentences that amount to 89 years for a
juvenile offender and noting confusion in the circuits regarding constitutionality of de facto life sentences).
235. See supra Section II; LAVIGNE ETAL., supra note 91, at 19 21.
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sentence lengths remain untouched. The Kansas JRI experience evidences this
point. There, the Council of State Governments Justice Center (an earlier iteration
of JRI) entered the state in 2006 to analyze criminal justice system drivers. In
2007, the state adopted JRI legislation focusing on recidivism reduction for
low-level offenders.2 36 These reforms stabilized the Kansas prison population in
2008, before it grew by between eight and nine percent between 2009 and 2012.237
JRI reentered the state in 2012 with new recommendations focused on costeffective responses to probation violations, graduated sanctions, and risk assessments in community supervision. 238 Enacted in 2013, the legislative reforms will
avert $56 million in prison operating costs, but they will not reduce the state's
prison population.23 9
California's Public Safety Realignment Plan does the same. 2 0 It explicitly
avoids shortening sentences for offenders already serving sentences in state prison,
despite federal orders to do just that.24 1 Moreover, the reform does not require
shorter sentences for the nonviolent, non-serious, non-sex offenders falling
within the scope of the legislation.24 2 Lawmakers hope that Realignment's focus
on rehabilitative services will reduce the number of offenders reentering state
prison and spur the use of alternatives to incarceration for more offenders.24 3
Studies on current implementation demonstrate that most offenders are being
shifting from 2prison
to county jail without the accompanying shortening terms of
4
incarceration.
Reforms introduced at the federal level avoid reducing sentence length for most
offenders while proposing new penalties that may increase sentence length for
some. The Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act introduces new mandatory
minimum penalties for domestic violence and terrorist related offenses, even while

236. The JRI legislation focused on reducing parole revocation rates and increasing credits for incarcerated
offenders completing rehabilitative programming. LAVIGNE ETAL., supra note 91, at 73.
237. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 26; COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS JUSTICE CTR., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT IN

KANSAS 4 (2013) [hereinafter JUSTICE REINVESTMENT IN KANSAS], http://csgjusticecenter.org/jr/kansas/publications/
justice-reinvestment-in-kansas-analyses-policy-options-to-reduce-spending-on-corrections-reinvest-instrategies-to-increase-public-safety; see also LAVIGNE ET AL., supra note 91, at 73 (attributing the subsequent rise
in incarceration to funding reductions and penalty enhancements).
238. See generally JUSTICE REINVESTMENT IN KANSAS, supra note 237, at 5 11.

239. LAVIGNE ET AL., supra note 91, at 73 ("JRI reforms are projected to save Kansas an estimated $125
million in averted construction costs and $56 million over five years by slowing the prison growth rate from 9
percent to 4 percent between 2013 and 2018.").
240. See supra Part II.B.
241. See id.
242. These offenders are referred to colloquially as the "non-non-nons." See, e.g., GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12,
at 165.
243. Joan Petersilia, CaliforniaPrisonDownsizing and Its Impact on Local CriminalJustice Systems, 8 HARV.
L. & PoL'Y REV. 327, 327 (2014).
244. See id. at 348, 350 (noting that most stakeholders are concerned that more individuals are serving long
sentences in jail rather than prison).
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reducing mandatory penalties for some drug offenses.245 The CORRECTIONS
Act seeks to increase access to treatment for certain categories of offenders, but it
does nothing to reduce the length of sentence.&26 Even those who could qualify for
additional earned credit would not receive a reduction in the amount of the annual
cap on earned time credit per year.247 This means that such inmates could receive
more treatment but could not reduce the length of their sentence further for earning
those credits. Other bills that would reduce mandatory minimum penalties have
been opposed as "misguided," 8 or they have been obscured on the grounds that
more treatment is also vitally necessary to the system.249 Though Congress
continues to debate the contours of a comprehensive criminal justice reform bill,
reductions in mandatory minimum penalties remain controversial.2
In addition, the drug court paradigm does more than obscure increasing sentence
lengths; it actually exacerbates the problem by encouraging reforms that expand
these populations. Support for easing up on drug offenders and other nonviolent
offenders implicitly or explicitly means freeing resources in order to get tough on
the "really bad guys. ' '2 5 l As a result, the reforms adopted within the paradigm
produce policies that decrease punishment for certain offenders while often
increasing punishment for other categories of offenders.2 5 2 Marie Gottschalk
refers to this trend in reform as "split policy verdicts. 2 5 3 Another scholar recently
referred to it as a "bifurcation strategy., 25 4 For example, in South Carolina,
legislators adopted a penal reform package in 2010 that eliminated mandatory
minimum sentences for simple drug possession, expanded parole eligibility for

245. See Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, S. 2123, 114th Cong. § 101.
246. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
247. Id.
248. See Chuck Grassley, Letter to the Editor, Sentencing Reform: 3 Senators Speak Out, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23,
2015), http://nyti.ms/1DJdiXx ("The reality is that reductions in federal mandatory minimum sentences are
misguided. These sentences are vital in obtaining the cooperation necessary to prosecute leaders in the drug
trade.").
249. See John Cornyn & Sheldon Whitehouse, Letter to the Editor, Sentencing Reform: 3 Senators Speak Out,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/23/opinion/sentencing-reform-3-senators-speakout.html ("We agree that we should reform other aspects of our criminal justice system. But no one should
minimize the importance of ending the cycle of recidivism, reducing prison costs and helping inmates succeed
upon release.").
250. See Steinhauer, supra note 1 (detailing current debate on sentencing reform and suggesting that a new
comprehensive bill will likely expand safety valves but not reduce mandatory minimum penalties).
251. See Obama, supra note 81 ("But every dollar [DOJ] ha[s] to spend keeping nonviolent drug offenders in
prison is a dollar they can't spend going after drug kingpins, or tracking down terrorists, or hiring more police and
giving them the resources that would allow them to do a more effective job community policing.").
252. See, e.g., COUZENS & BIGELOW, supra note 147, at 8, ("Since the mandatory provisions [of Proposition
36] remove any of the court's discretion to sentence concurrently, the punishment is increased for crimes
sentenced under [section 1170.12(a)(7)]."); Eaglin, supra note 9, at 220; see supra notes 152 58 and accompanying text.
253. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12, at 167.
254. Christopher Seeds, BifurcationNation: Strategy in ContemporaryAmerican Punishment (June 1, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id =2613083.
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offenders convicted of certain felonies, and increased alternatives to incarceration
for first-time offenders convicted of nonviolent drug trafficking offenses. 25 5 The
package also reclassified twenty-two new crimes as violent crimes that qualify for
enhanced sentencing penalties and expanded the list of crimes that qualify for life
without parole. 6 In Indiana, proposed JRI legislation included severe new
mandatory minimums. 7 Though JRI's legislation failed, the state's revision to the
criminal code in 2014 was accompanied by a series of increased penalties for
violent and habitual offenders to increase their sentence lengths automatically.25 8
In addition, even where sentences may be reduced to community supervision
rather than incarceration, the length of supervision may remain the same or even
increase. For example, California's Public Safety Realignment does not shorten
sentences, it shifts the location and method of surveillance for low-level offenders. 259 Similarly, the expansion of treatment-oriented programs as alternatives to
incarceration continue to impose intrusive state-controlled surveillance on individuals. 260 Neither of these alternatives are as initially offensive as incarceration, but
they do continue state control and expose individuals to constant and intrusive
contact with the state. 26 1 That these intrusions are obscured by the drug court
paradigm's emphasis on evidence-based interventions is a matter discussed in
more detail in Part C below.
C. The Justice System's Expanding Reach

The drug court paradigm encourages reforms that expand the justice system's
reach. Recent reforms adopted within the frame provide rehabilitative treatment,
but they often increase surveillance as well. Increased community supervision
extends state control over individuals and exposes low-level offenders to the
potential for harsher punishment in the future. For example, Texas adopted reforms
in 2007 that emphasized treatment in the community rather than in prison. 262 It
also reduced the maximum probation term for drug and property felony offenses
from ten to five years and mandated that judges review probation length after two
and a half years. 26 3 But defendants who fail to complete court-ordered counseling

255. Eaglin, supra note 9, at 220.
256. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12, at 167.
257. See Eaglin, supra note 114, at 878 79.
258. See supra note 123.
259. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
260. See CLEAR & FROST, supra note 39, at 24 (suggesting that "growth in surveillance and other ostensibly
community based sanctions served to fuel growth in incarceration" because it "enhanced [the] ability to detect
failure and ... increased [the] chance of incarceration as a result of those failures").
261. See Natapoff, supra note 13, at 1095 97 (explaining how drug courts and decriminalization continue
social control through payment of fines, attendance at meetings and enrollment and completion of treatment
programs); Klingele, supra note 12, at 574 (suggesting that evidence-based practices focused on surveillance are
forms of "less-than-benign social control).
262. H.B. 1678, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 1, 6, 7, 8 (Tex. 2007).
263. Id.
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or treatment are not eligible for shortened supervision terms, even if they did not
commit a new offense.26 4 Defendants who fail to pay for their treatment are not
eligible for shortened terms either.26 s In those instances, the community supervision lasts for a full period equal to the minimum term of imprisonment. While the
specific conditions of community supervision may vary, they range from submitting for drug testing to electronic monitoring to confinement in jail.26 6 Such
requirements function to extend the state's control over the individual beyond the
determination of guilt. And while the punishment appears less punitive than
incarceration, it remains incapacitative in nature.2 67 This exposes people on
supervision to an increased likelihood of incarceration in the future, as they are
more likely to commit technical violations of supervision conditions like failing
drug test or missing a court appointment. 268 Numerous states have similar
requirements for community supervision.2 6 9
Mass incarceration represents one way of addressing social ills (for example,
homelessness, mental health issues, drug abuse issues, etc.). The rise in crime was
real, as was the growing economic stratification, disinvestment in urban communities, and lack of employment opportunities for undereducated citizens. 270 Lawmakers chose to respond to these crises with a "tough on crime" focus, and increases in
policing and prisons. 27 1 Drug court paradigm reforms do not contest this response
outright, and they do not demand a reduction in the criminal justice system's reach.
These reforms do not, standing alone, respond to the underlying social causes of
crime and mass incarceration; instead they introduce new opportunities to use the
criminal justice system to respond to social ills. 27 2 Rather than using incarceration,
government officials may choose to pursue this avenue by collapsing public policy
273
strategies like drug treatment into criminal justice strategies.

264. ROBINA INST. OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, UNIV. OF MINN, PROFILES IN PROBATION REVOCATION:
EXAMINING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

IN 21 STATES 78 80 (2014) [hereinafter

ROBINA INST.],

http://www.

robinainstitute.org/publications/profiles-probation-revocation-examining-legal-framework-2 1-states/.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 79.
267. See Miller, supra note 43, at 1558; Natapoff, supra note 13, at 1087 89.
268. See generally EAGLIN & SOLOMON, supra note 53, at 20-22.
269. See generally ROBINA INST., supra note 264, at 78 80.
270. See CLEAR & FROST, supra note 39, at 58 (mass incarceration as a policy response to crime, and the
underlying social and ecological causes of crime).
271. See id. at 47 70 (presenting mass incarceration as a "grand social experiment" used to deal with crime as
a social problem).
272. Darryl K. Brown, The PerverseEffects ofEfficiency in CriminalProcess, 100 VA. L. REv. 183, 220 (2014)
("[Efficiency] contributes... to the larger-scale norms and policy choices regarding what social problems should
be addressed with criminal law, and whether criminal law or an alternative policy intervention is most appropriate
to address a wide range of problems .... ").
273. See id. at 200 ("[A]s greater efficiency reduces the overall cost of criminal law enforcement, it makes it
less costly for legislatures to create new offenses, and more tempting to choose criminal enforcement over other
public policy strategies to address social problems or regulatory agendas."); Eric J. Miller, Foreword to JANE
DONOGHUE, TRANSFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE? PROBLEM-SOLVINGAND COURT SPECIALISATION, at xx (2014).
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The drug court paradigm's focus on effectiveness may obscure normative
questions on policy developments as well. Whether social ills should be addressed
through the criminal justice system may be overlooked when evidence demonstrates that social ills can be addressed through the criminal justice system.
Scholars have grappled with this dilemma for some time-should criminal
justice sanctions be used to induce treatment? 274 This drug court paradigm's focus
on effectiveness may compound this dilemma. Reforms adopted within the
paradigm seek to answer questions about efficiency and effectiveness. How
efficient can we be at providing services? How much money does it save? This
focus obscures the normative question underlying the policy developments: should
certain services be provided through the criminal justice system? States can reduce
their incarcerated population and shift spending to other public services; or
increase criminal justice capacities by reducing incarceration for some types of
offenders. Trends in state incarceration rates suggests that most states have chosen
the latter option-modestly alter the method of supervision for some offenders to
increase criminal justice services, like policing, probation, and punitive treatment
programs. Rather than reducing reliance on criminal justice to resolve social ills,
states can simply change the way they use their correctional resources. Reforms
adopted within the drug court paradigm's frame tend to demonstrate this point. JRI
states are now using justice reinvestment savings to fund community corrections
and law enforcement agencies.275 JRI reforms encourage the creation of punitive
treatment programs as an alternative to incarceration, along with other EBPPs that
increase surveillance while potentially decreasing incarceration.2 76 California's
Public Safety Realignment similarly encourages surveillance mechanisms like
GPS monitoring and drug treatment programs to manage the influx of offenders
directed to local jails rather than state prisons.277 Efficiencies in these states can
stabilize the justice system's costs without meaningfully detracting its reach.2 78
Studies on efficiency gains in court adjudication support this dichotomy in
responses as well. 279 The paradigm's focus on efficiency, then, hides a deeper
tension about whether moving away from mass incarceration requires relinquish-

274. See, e.g., Alex Kreit, The Decriminalization Option: Should States Consider Moving from a Criminal to a
Civil Drug Court Model?, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 299, 304-05 (2010) (urging states to adopt civil, rather than
criminal, drug courts); MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW To HAVE LESS CRIME AND LESS
PUNISHMENT 149 63 (2009) (arguing that innovative diversion programs need "frequent test[ing] and quick and
consistent sanctions for failure to comply" in order to maintain high success rates).
275. AUSTIN ETAL., supra note 6, at 6.
276. See supra notes 96-100 (describing typical JRI reforms).
277. See supra note 138 (discussing reforms adopted in different California counties in response to Public
Safety Realignment).
278. Public Safety Realignment reduced California's state prison population, but it did not reduce the overall
incarcerated population in the state. Georgia's popular JRI reforms adopted in 2013 successfully led to reductions
in the state's prison population, but the state's probation and parole population continues to rise. See supra notes
101 04 (discussing Kansas and Texas reforms).
279. See Brown, supra note 272, at 194 95.
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ing actual state control over criminal offenders.2 80
IV.

ON REIMAGINING PUNISHMENT

Drug courts were the leading innovation and intervention created in response to
the pressures mass incarceration placed on criminal justice actors. This Article
demonstrates how this innovation shaped and influenced current, different criminal justice "interventions." Previous Sections expose systemic shortcomings
inherent to the frame of reform that shape the current wave of criminal justice
reform. More than simply the result of a political tradeoff, this paradigm frames
mass incarceration in a way that is spurring a new conceptualization of who and
how to punish.
Identifying the frame provides new insight into the direction of criminal justice
reform. Part A argues that the current frame's focus on evidence of recidivism
reduction and cost-efficiency represents the success of drug courts in reshaping
definitions of government "success" in criminal justice context. Part B explores the
meaning of this shift for the politics of punishment.
A. Redefining "Success" in Reforms
The drug court paradigm captures an approach to justice reform whose origin
lies in government disillusionment in its criminal justice capacities. In 2001,
sociologist David Garland observed a unique bifurcation in the U.S. government's
response to high crime rates and its own inability to control crime: state agencies
responded to indictments of government failure by "scaling down expectations .... redefining their aims, and seeking to change the criteria by which failure
and success are judged" in the context of criminal justice. 28 1 Politicians, on the
other hand, began the expressive and
well-documented tough on crime campaigns
28 2
severity.
punishment
to increase
In shifting the criteria used to define success in criminal justice, drug courts
reflect an agency response to government failure. Criteria of success once turned
on social goals-like crime rates and catching offenders.28 3 Starting in the 1980s,
the government sought to be evaluated by performance indicators over which they
had more control, like measures of economy and efficiency, regardless of whether
these had effects on crime or convictions.2 84 Drug courts represent one example of
the numerous "micro-interventions at the local and community level to change the
behavior of individuals" in response to disillusionment with government failures

280. Natapoff, supra note 13, at 1089 (describing a "deep struggle within modern American penal culture" as
tension between "the urge to move away from mass incarceration on the one hand and the system's reluctance to
relinquish criminal control over even the most minor offenders on the other").
281. GARLAND, supra note 16, at 119.
282. Id. at 134 35.
283. Id. at 119.
284. Id. at 120.
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in criminal justice.28 5 Drug courts evaluate themselves based upon internal,
measurable goals like efficiency and effectiveness rather than broader social goals
like reduced incidences of crime.28 6 Additionally, the government shifts responsibility for outcomes onto the defendants themselves, introducing a new personal
accountability aspect to the success of treatment programs.28 7 This innovative
reform did more than simply facilitate treatment in communities; it also advanced
a broader shift in how the government chose to measure success.
Drug courts illustrate the dangerous dichotomy of the dual governmental
responses described by Garland. While redefining measures of success, drug
courts facilitated an increasingly punitive criminal justice system.28 8 Perhaps the
most interesting aspect of drug courts lies not in how it changed the system; rather,
it is how it markedly left criminal justice policies the same. Drug courts provided a
response to increased court caseloads and prison overcrowding as a result of the
War on Drugs, but the courts did not dismantle the retributive prosecutorial model
that characterizes the incarcerative justice system. 28 9 Drug arrests increased
exponentially as drug courts expanded across the states. 290 Drug courts simply
provided an alternative response to incarceration for the commission of drug
crimes, without actually decriminalizing drug use. 2 9 1 These programs "provide[d]
a safety valve for the cycle of incarceration-release-recidivism that filled prisons
with low-level drug users" while allowing prosecutors to continue expansive
charging practices.292 To the extent that drug courts shifted the focus away from
the government's inability to achieve traditional criminal justice goals, the new
success measures actually advanced a criminal justice system more capable of
expansion. Drug courts left untouched enforcement of increasingly punitive drug
policies. In fact, drug courts may have incentivized police and prosecutors to
expand the number of individuals processed within the system for drug offenses
due to the well-meaning belief that the justice system would offer better treatment.2 93

285. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12, at 18.
286. See supra notes 58 64.
287. See Miller, supra note 42, at 425.
288. See supra Section I (explaining that drug courts were created in 1989 but prison populations continued to
grow for another decade).
289. See Miller, supra note 42, at 421.
290. Arrests of adults for drug abuse increased from 1,008,300 in 1990 (the year after drug courts were
created) to 1,375,600 in 2000 (with 665 drug courts in existence) to 1,693,100 in 2006 (with 1,756 drug courts in
existence). See TINA L. DORSEY & PRISCILLA MIDDLETON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DRUGS AND CRIME
FACTS, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dcf.pdf; NAT'L DRUG COURT INST., supra note 70; see also Miller,
supra note 42, at 420 n.20.
291. NOLAN, supra note 62, at 53 ("[T]he drug courts essentially circumvent the legalization debate. The drug
courts embrace a disease view of addiction, but this does not remove from the state its role in controlling drug
use."); Dorf& Sabel, supra note 44, at 832.
292. See Miller, supra note 42, at 417.
293. O'Hear, supra note 54, at 483 (quoting one local drug court judge as stating that "the very presence of
drug courts is causing police to make arrests in, and prosecutors to file, the kinds of ten- and twenty-dollar
hand-to-hand drug cases that the system would not have bothered with before") (internal citations omitted).
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The laser focus on effectiveness and efficiency at the heart of the drug court
paradigm expands upon a new "measure of success" in criminal justice. By
focusing on what can be quantified, these measures resonate with internally
applied governmental agency measures. Recidivism reduction and cost-effectiveness are connected to public safety indirectly, unlike some pure-outcome measures
like number of arrests or cases processed (though such measures are still used,
too). 2 9 4 Still, these measures are susceptible to substantive critiques. For example,
the EBPPs underlying JRI reforms also focus on outcomes over process. While
these reforms are heavily criticized for their failure to actually improve
communities most affected by mass incarceration policies,295 such critiques fall
outside the paradigm's frame and offer little salience with lawmakers or the public.
Similarly, attacks about how recidivism is measured-whether it includes rearrests, technical violations, or just convictions for new offenses-lack salience,
296
too.
This Article's analysis demonstrates why: these reforms build from the
initial government strategy to change measures of success.
That change insulates
297
the government from criticism about larger social failures.
To the extent that this frame permits reforms that come short of reducing mass
incarceration, the frame's origin in drug courts explains that too. Though drug
courts helped create a political environment capable of identifying and empathizing with certain low-level, nonviolent offenders,2 98 the programs did more to
change measures of success than they did to check political punitiveness. Now,
even as states begin to advance policy reforms focused on evidence of effectiveness, these reforms continue to permit and obscure additional reforms that expand
the criminal justice net and increase punitiveness for large swaths of offenders.
It is not business-as-usual in the justice system as states are transforming the
tenets of success in administering criminal justice. Yet analysis of the drug court
paradigm demonstrates that these reforms have done more to redefine how we
measure "success" than they have done to actually reduce reliance on the criminal
justice system to address social ills. This frame, and the reforms adopted within it,
continues to shift how we measure success in criminal justice. Through it, the new
wave of EBPPs are spreading across the country, changing how we punish certain
offenders, but it does little to challenge notions about who should be punished and

294. See CHETTIAR ET AL., supra note 27, at 4 (discussing how state and local agencies use indicators focused
on the number of arrests or the amount of drugs seized as performance measures).
295. See AUSTIN ETAL., supra note 6, at 6 7 (criticizing JRI); GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12, at 101 103 (same).
296. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12, at 101 103.
297. GARLAND, supra note 16, at 120.
298. See Eaglin, supra note 9, at 191, n.5 (describing the increasingly bipartisan nature of calls for criminal
justice reform); Hanna Kozlowska, You May Have Missed It, But There Was an Election Debate on Criminal
Justice Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2014), http://op-talk.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/06/you-may-have-missedit-but-there-was-an-election-debate-on-criminal-justice-reform (describing the bipartisan nature of recent criminal justice policy reforms in the states); EJ Hurst, Federal Sentencing and Prison Reform Now BipartisanIssues,
THE HILL (Aug. 13, 2014), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/crime/214998-federal-sentencing-and-prisonreform-now-bipartisan-issues (describing the bipartisan nature of sentencing reforms proposed at federal level).
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why. Whether these reforms increase traditional notions of social justice is simply
a by-product of a larger shift in managing expectations about crime control.
B. Reconsidering the Politics of Punishment

Transforming success measures proved central to launching a new, depoliticized discourse on criminal justice reform. It is well documented that being
perceived as "tough on crime" created political capital for politicians, judges,
and prosecutors at the end of the twentieth century. 299 Today, there is growing

political value in being "smart on crime" that originally appeared in response to
budgetary constraints experienced by states during the Great Recession.30 0 Pundits
30 1
from across the political spectrum now engage in "smart on crime" politics.
Justice Reinvestment states like Texas are heralded for finding solutions on
criminal justice reform. Association with that success has translated into national
notoriety for some politicians.30 2
The drug court paradigm demonstrates that "smart" on crime policies reach
beyond budgetary concerns. The drug court paradigm resonates with so many
people because it addresses an underlying disillusionment with the government's
efficacy, and quells divisive socioeconomic issues. By the 2000s, solutions to mass
incarceration were politically mired in issues of race and class. 30 3 As Eric Miller
explains, the drug courts' success lies partially in its ability to "disaggregate the
problem of drug crime from social and governmental forces. ' ' 304 The drug court
paradigm builds upon this strategy by taking the emphasis off race and class,
replacing that discourse with an emphasis on evidence of effectiveness and

299. STUNTZ, supra note 28, at 254-56 ("To the local voters who elect those officials, and hence to the officials
they elect, prison sentences are nearly a free good.").
300. Barkow, supra note 12 at 1305 06 (explaining how cost constraints create a more balanced process in
sentencing policy).
301. See Hillary Clinton, Remarks at the 18th Annual David N. Dinkins Leadership and Public Policy Forum
(Apr. 29, 2015), https://sipa.columbia.edu/dinkins-forum; Statement of Principles, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://
rightoncrime.com/the-conservative-case-for-reform/statement-of-principles/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2016); Rand
Paul Supports Reform to the CriminalJusticeSystem, RAND PAUL, https://www.randpaul.com/issue/criminal-justicereforms (last visited Feb. 8, 2016); Obama, supra note 81 (focusing on unnecessary incarceration of low-level,
nonviolent drug offenders).
302. Notable politicians who have enjoyed national notoriety for their "smart on crime" stances include Rand
Paul, Hillary Clinton, Newt Gingrich, Chris Christie, Kamala Harris, and Rick Perry. See, e.g., BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, supra note 66 (noting, in summary, that "[iln this remarkable bipartisan collaboration, the country's most
prominent public figures and experts join together to propose ideas for change"); Paul Beinart, Hillary Clinton
and the Tragic Politics of Crime, ATLANTIC (May 1, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/05/
the-tragic-politics-of-crime/392114/ (noting Hillary Clinton's denouncement of mass incarceration); Peter Baker,
2016 CandidatesAre United in Call toAlter Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (April 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/04/28/us/politics/being-less-tough-on-crime-is-2016-consensus.html (summarizing presidential candidates' views on how to change the justice system).
303. See supra notes 33 35, 41-45; Miller, supra note 42, at 427 28.
304. Miller, supra note 42, at 427.
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efficiency. This disaggregation is central to the "smart on crime" approach
consistent with the drug court paradigm.
The shortcomings of the drug court paradigm cast doubt on whether depoliticized reforms can end mass incarceration. Endorsing and advancing policy
changes that are based in data-driven evidence proving effectiveness or efficiency
removes the political aspect of addressing mass incarceration. Removing the
political aspects of mass incarceration proved valuable in stabilizing prison
populations, an important achievement. Analysis of this frame suggests that it does
little to address the hard questions that sustain mass incarceration. To the extent
that the drug court paradigm rejects this discourse, it helps to sustain mass
incarceration even though its reforms are directly responding to the outcomes of
these issues.
Despite the depoliticizing aspect of the drug court paradigm, analyzing the
origin of this frame provides insight to a growing tension between the public and
governmental actors around the scope of criminal justice reforms. As explained
above, the drug court paradigm is a response to the discourse on government
failings in criminal justice. To governmental agencies and now, through this frame
of reform, politicians, this failure revolves around the government's limited ability
to control crime in the face of rising crime rates. There is some evidence that the
public perceives "government failure" more broadly than governmental actors
intended. For example, California's struggle to address its systemic prison overcrowding problems led to the adoption of both Proposition 36 and Proposition 47,
305
two reforms that break the drug court paradigm mold in important ways.
Additionally, some connect recent marijuana decriminalization reforms to the
public's perception about government failures in the face of mass incarceration.30 6
Increasingly, "government failure" includes mass incarceration itself. Government
actors changed their success measures to manage expectations about the government's ability to ensure public safety. These efforts may have simultaneously
prepared the public for messaging about the government's inability to respond to
the detrimental social effects of mass incarceration-like recidivism, unemployment and isolation. In these states, the public has appetite for more reform than the
government itself can accept.
The drug court paradigm may provide insight into this tension. Politicians are
not prepared to view mass incarceration as a government failure. Their perspective
is more limited to the government's ability to control crime. But the public is
getting a myriad of messages, circling around costs, government failure, reduced
recidivism, and dropping crime rates. The public may be mixing the more nuanced
perspective of government officials with the new measures that the government is
advancing itself (cost savings).

305. See supra Part I.B.
306. See Natapoff, supra note 13, at 1077.

2016]

THE DRUG

COURT PARADIGM

Reforms that break the drug court paradigm provide examples. In California,
Proposition 47 received broad opposition from government actors, but not from
the public. 30 ' The public can support Proposition 47 because it responds to
unnecessary incarceration and saves money. The government, meanwhile, can
oppose the reform because it goes beyond prisoner diversion due to overcrowding
or budgetary pressures, instead reducing correctional supervision often perceived
as necessary. Less obvious and more awkward, the U.S. Sentencing Commission's
decision to reduce prison sentences under the drugs-minus-two amendment
presses this tension point as well. There, the Justice Department opposed efforts to
apply the drugs-minus-two amendment to the entire federal prison population,
calling for a more restrictive retroactive application of the Sentencing Commissions amendment. 30 8 The Sentencing Commission, bolstered by the 80,000 letters
largely supporting broad application of the amendment, denied the Justice Department's narrow approach.30 9 Why? Perhaps this agency, like the public itself, is
more inclined to take the governmental call for cost-savings and evidence-based
practices at its word.
Not surprisingly, these reforms that break from the drug court paradigm's frame
also stand to reduce mass incarceration most quickly and completely because they
affect broad swaths of offenders already incarcerated. These reforms also contract
the reach of the criminal justice system. Going forward, advocates should continue
to push this tension between what the public can accept and what the government
wants within the drug court paradigm's depoliticized frame to explore different
reforms that would reduce the harsh social and economic effects of mass incarceration. This tension creates the space for opportunity.
CONCLUSION

Drug courts provided a valuable and necessary alternative framework to
understand and combat mass incarceration. These diversionary courts spurred a
rethinking of "justice" in an increasingly punitive criminal system. But beyond
simply inspiring the proliferation of specialized courts, drug courts have influenced criminal justice reform by creating a paradigm to address overcapacity and
underfunded prison systems generally. While there is much to celebrate in this
influence, the drug court movement was never intended to serve as a template for

307. See Shelley Zimmerman, Bonnie Dumanis & William Gore, Why Law Enforcement Opposes Proposition
47, TIMES OF SAN DIEGO (Oct. 30, 2014), http://timesofsandiego.comlopinion/2014/10/30/law-enforcement-

opposes-proposition-47/; Marisa Lagos, Lawmakers Back Away From Major Changes to Prop. 47 Criminal
Justice Reforms, KQED NEWS (May 5,2015), http://ww2.kqed.org/news/2015/05/05/lawmakers-back-away-frommajor-changes-to-prop-47-criminal-justice-reforms (noting that "after decades of voters pushing for tougher
criminal justice laws, the pendulum has now swung wildly in the other direction, a change to which it's difficult
for many in law enforcement to adjust").
308. See supra Part II.C.
309. See Horwitz, supra note 200.
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reducing mass incarceration, nor, as a policy matter, should we now overextend its

influence.
The drug court paradigm carved out the political space for a new frame of
reform that comes with a high cost. This Article exposes several of those costs. At
the same time, the pervasiveness of the frame provides valuable insights to
addressing mass incarceration. In defining the drug court paradigm and tracing its
persistent limitations, this Article demonstrates how the shifting definition of
"success" in the criminal justice system presents an opportunity to confront mass
incarceration through policies focused on effectiveness and efficiency. Most
reforms within the drug court paradigm do little to practically change who we
punish. The most meaningful criminal justice reforms break from the paradigm on
this critical front-they redefine how we treat people with limited criminal
records. Continuing to push reforms in this direction provides a promising avenue
to reduce not only the costs of mass incarceration, but also the deleterious effects
of the phenomenon.

